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ABSTRACT 
Since its creation in 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
allocated more than $40 billion in preparedness and homeland security grant funds to 
state, local, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions. The primary objectives of these funds are 
to develop and sustain the essential capabilities necessary to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from natural and man-caused disasters. Notwithstanding DHS’s numerous efforts 
and initiatives, the ability to quantify and report on the effectiveness of these funds in 
meeting these objectives falls short of current federal requirements. This thesis examines 
statutory requirements for assessing and reporting on national preparedness, reviews the 
history of systems and programs developed by DHS to meet federal performance 
assessment and reporting requirements, reviews the fundamental principles of 
performance management, and assesses current elements of the homeland security 
enterprise. These reviews and assessments formulate a basis to remedy the longstanding 
shortfalls in preparedness performance management. This inquiry resulted in five 
overarching findings and twelve recommendations. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Over the past decade, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
issued specific policy guidance documents directing the establishment of performance 
measures that assess national preparedness. These policy documents include the 2003 
Homeland Security Policy Directive (HSPD)-8, the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA), the 2010 Modernization Act, and most 
recently the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8. Performance reporting 
requirements under these federal documents include developing preparedness plans and 
strategies; reporting performance metrics and measures; and identifying the risks of 
specific threats, and recognizing the vulnerabilities and prioritized objectives needed to 
mitigate those risks.   
Numerous efforts to comply with performance measurement requirements have 
occurred over the past decade, but FEMA has yet to develop a system that satisfies these 
directives. As a result, there is increased scrutiny over the expenditure of federal grant 
funds and Congress has reduced the amount of federal grant dollars to SLTT programs by 
approximately 85 percent over a ten-year period.1 Additionally, state, local, tribal and 
territorial (SLTT) entities are consistently identified in DHS Office of Inspector General 
audits as lacking a capability to track performance indicators.  
The purpose of the inquiry for this thesis is to develop a model for collecting, 
analyzing, and reporting on the performance management of SLTT jurisdictions 
receiving DHS block grant funding for preparedness programs. This model is generic to 
account for the various geopolitical and strategic influences among the jurisdictions as 
well as the relevant natural and human-caused hazards and threats that present risks and 
vulnerabilities to each entity.   
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Years 2004–2014 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security), http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget, accessed October 4, 2014. 
 2 
B. BACKGROUND 
In the early 1990s, Congress found that excessive waste and inefficiency in 
federal programs undermined the public’s confidence in government, which reduced the 
federal government’s ability to address public needs adequately. Congress also 
determined the performance management of federal agencies was insufficient to set 
policy and inform spending decisions.2 The outcome of this limitation negatively affected 
the efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs.3 The frustration led to the 
development of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), which obligated 
all federal agencies to develop strategic and performance plans with an annual reporting 
requirement. Congress updated the GPRA under the GPRA Modernization Act 
(GPRAMA) of 2010, which retained most of the original requirements with added 
requirements, processes, and reports.4   
In keeping with GPRA and GPRAMA obligations, federal law and Presidential 
Directives established specific performance management requirements for DHS. In 2003, 
the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 charged DHS “to establish 
measurable readiness priorities and targets, include readiness metrics, and develop a 
system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness.”5 Three years later, the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006 required all national 
preparedness plans and strategies to include “updated, clear, and quantifiable 
performance metrics, measures, and outcomes.”6 Finally, in 2011, Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD)-8 stated national preparedness “shall be informed by the risk of specific 
                                                 
2 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–352, 
124 Stat. 3866 (2011). 
5 George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, Directive on National Preparedness 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2003), 1823, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-12-
22/pdf/WCPD-2003-12-22-Pg1822.pdf. 
6 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2007 (Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act of 2006), Pub. L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1428 (2006). 
 3 
threats and vulnerabilities, taking into account regional variations and include concrete, 
measurable, and prioritized objectives to mitigate that risk.”7 
Over the years, DHS leadership initiated many projects to develop performance 
management systems that would collect information and report on state preparedness 
capabilities. A few of the systems evolved through several iterations—and there are 
indications of significant stakeholder involvement on some—but the systems never 
reached full implementation. Notwithstanding all the directives and the many 
implementation attempts, the significant shortfall in achieving a national preparedness 
assessment is the lack of “clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and 
performance measures that are needed to identify capability gaps.”8  
The ability to implement a national preparedness assessment remains laden with 
many weighty challenges. First, many organizations collect data on emergency 
preparedness “for different purposes, in many different forms, and to differing degrees of 
thoroughness,”9 because the responsibility for all-hazard protection, response, and 
mitigation flows across all levels of government. In short, the number of federal 
organizations involved in the nation’s preparedness activities makes for a massive and 
complex enterprise. This problem is even more compounded if all state, local, tribal, and 
territorial jurisdictions—along with the various public and private entities—are 
appropriately included in the equation. 
Second, DHS is still a new organization experiencing growing pains as it matures. 
For example, when DHS was created, all preparedness programs within the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were transferred to DHS’s new Directorate for 
Preparedness. Congress reversed the reorganizational change three years later under the 
                                                 
7 Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2011), 2, http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-nationalpreparedness. 
8 David C. Maurer, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps Are 
Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities (GAO 13–637T) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2013), 10, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655392.pdf.  
9 Government Accountability Office (GAO), FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop 
and Implement a System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities (GAO-11-51R) (Washington, DC: 
GAO, 2013), 31, http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97160.pdf. 
 4 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA),10 returning most of the 
preparedness programs back to FEMA. The change in agency ownership of developed 
systems caused a breakdown in program management. For example, two programs 
affected by the transfer were the National Exercise Program and the comprehensive 
assessment system. While PKEMRA became effective in March of 2007, many of the 
staff positions within the new offices were not filled until November of 2008. Not only 
did the program lose a majority of its professional expertise, there was a significant gap 
in resources to manage the programs for well over a year.11  
Third, in addition to the numerous organizational permutations, FEMA is in a 
constant state of flux. The agency’s response to an increasing trend in the number of 
disasters and emergencies across the nation affects their ability to manage programs and 
shepherd new initiatives due to the strain on responding resources. The recent economic 
downturn also affected progress due to increased budgetary constraints at all levels of 
government, which can reduce staff and program funding. DHS’s Office of the Inspector 
General indicated concern that FEMA does not have “sufficient staff focused on planning 
and preparedness efforts.”12 
Finally, DHS has faced numerous external challenges to implementing a 
performance management system. One such challenge is data reliability, which is 
dependent on self-reported preparedness data and assessments from state, local, and tribal 
jurisdictions. A related challenge is the development of standardized metrics. FEMA 
identified these various challenges and has thus far unsuccessfully attempted to mitigate 
them through development of standardized, web-based data collection tools.13 
The ability to collect reliable data from state, local, and tribal entities is a 
challenge that must be resolved for a national preparedness performance management 
                                                 
10 GAO, FEMA Has Made Progress, 20. 
11 Ibid., 20–21. 
12 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next 
Catastrophic Disaster —An Update (OIG-10-123) (Washington, DC: DHS  September 2010), 55, 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-123_Sep10.pdf.  
13 Government Accountability Office (GAO), FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to 
Develop and Implement a System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities (GAO-11-51R) 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), 19, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97160.pdf. 
 5 
system to reach fruition. Stakeholders adopting a congruent, comprehensive future 
assessment system are vital to the system’s success. While there is no data indicating 
previously developed systems were difficult to use, the ease of use, value, and reliability 
of the system’s output could potentially influence future federal resource allocation 
decisions. This concern could affect the perceived relative advantage of any new 
comprehensive assessment system. Complexity of the system will affect ease of use and 
therefore will likely be a significant concern to the stakeholders. There are limited 
staffing resources at the operational level, and any system requiring considerable effort 
and staff hours to meet the reporting requirements will likely meet considerable 
resistance.   
This challenge was identified by FEMA in 2009 during congressional testimony. 
The testimony included the following: “While these new initiatives have bolstered our 
nation’s level of preparedness, they have also created new federal requirements for state, 
territory, local, tribal and territorial emergency management and homeland security 
agencies. FEMA’s key partners in emergency management and homeland security report 
that the existing volume of requests for information is placing a significant strain on their 
resources.”14  
Almost from its inception, pressure arose for the DHS to exhibit the value and 
outcomes attained from the now over $40 billion in various preparedness grant 
programs.15 Due to the increased congressional scrutiny and lack of performance 
reporting, these grant programs have seen a reduction in allocation over the years. 
Resultantly, Congress limited preparedness grant funding in the 2011 through 2013 
budget cycles; budget requests yielded a reduction of $875 million, $1.28 billion, and 
                                                 
14 Preparedness: What Has $29 Billion in Homeland Security Grants Bought and How Do We Know? 
Hearing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency 
Communications, Preparedness and Response 9 (statement of Timothy Manning, Deputy Administrator, 
Protection and National Preparedness, FEMA, DHS), 111th Cong., 4, (2009), http-
chsdemocrats.house.gov-SiteDocuments-20091027102505-12931, accessed May 18, 2013. 
15 Department of Homeland Security , “DHS Announces Grant Allocations for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 
Preparedness Grants,” July 25, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/25/dhs-announces-grant-
allocations-fiscal-year-fy-2014-preparedness-grants. 
 6 
$400 million respectively.16 That FEMA could not demonstrate how federal grants 
enhanced disaster preparedness was a contributing factor in each fiscal year reduction.17  
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 
Response and Communications, Mark Ghilarducci, California state director for 
Emergency Services, testified to the impact of reduced funding:  
While the number of threats and hazards facing states and the nation has 
increased, federal support for state and local preparedness efforts has 
steadily decreased. Federal, non-disaster preparedness grant funding has 
dropped 75 percent since 2003. This reduction, combined with state and 
municipal budget challenges, significantly limited the ability of state and 
local governments to build new capabilities, sustain prior investments, and 
maintain forward momentum with preparedness efforts.18 
 
The reduction in spending authority for SLTT jurisdictions since 2003 is 
significant and noteworthy.  
Analysis of the DHS budget since 2008 reveals an interesting trend in funding. While 
the overall net budget for DHS increased approximately 11 percent over the seven-year 
period, the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) (which currently includes three 
general funding categories: the State Homeland Security Grant Program [SHSP], the Urban 
Area Security Initiative [UASI], and Operation Stonegarden [OPSG]) decreased 
approximately 38 percent overall. Funding to SHSP and OPSG endured a 53 percent funding 
reduction while the UASI cities decreased 32 percent.19 In general, the DHS funding 
portfolio has experienced a steady increase since it was founded, while the distribution to 
state and local jurisdictions has trended steadily downward.20 Is this trend a result of the 
                                                 
16 Mauer, National Preparedness, 9. 
17 Mauer, National Preparedness, 9, Note 16. 
18 National Governors Association, “Mark Ghilarducci, Testimony—A State Perspective on Assessing 
National Preparedness for Disasters,” September 19, 2013, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-
relations/nga-testimony/hsps-testimony/col2-content/main-content-list/testimony--a-state-perspective-
o.html. 
19 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Years 2008–2014 (Washington, 
DC: DHS), http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget, accessed October 4, 2014. 
20Preparedness What Has $29 Billion in Homeland Security Grants Bought and How Do We Know?, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, 111th 
Cong. (statement of Henry Cuellar, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, 
Preparedness and Response). 
 7 
inability of SLTT jurisdictions to report on their preparedness efforts, a deliberate shift in 
priorities of the federal government, or a combination of the two? 
A review of three seminal documents, the DHS Strategic Plan, the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and current preparedness grant guidance, reveals that 
it is important for the whole community to be involved in national preparedness. The 
QHSR identifies the whole of community partnership as “individuals and families, 
including those with access and functional needs; businesses; faith-based and community 
organizations; nonprofit groups; schools and academia; media outlets; and all levels of 
government, including federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.”21 Preparedness 
grant guidance indicates the HSGP “plays an important role in the implementation of the 
National Preparedness System by supporting the building, sustainment, and delivery of 
core capabilities essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal (the Goal) of a 
secure and resilient Nation. The building, sustainment, and delivery of these core 
capabilities are not exclusive to any single level of government, organization, or 
community, but rather, require the combined effort of the whole community.”22 
The latest DHS Strategic Plan and QHSR also emphasize the importance of 
partnerships within the whole community. DHS’s strategic plan identifies preparedness 
grant programs as a central activity in building and sustaining national core capabilities,23 
while the QHSR defines three core principles for the Whole Community approach:  
(1) understanding and meeting the actual needs of the Whole Community;  
(2) engaging and empowering all parts of the community; and  
(3) strengthening what works well in communities on a daily basis.24  
                                                 
21 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 74, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/qhsr/2014-QHSR.pdf. 
22 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA), FY 2014, 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security), 3, 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/92397. 
23 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security), 36, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY14-
18%20Strategic%20Plan.PDF. 
24 DHS, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 73. 
 8 
As the core funding for these efforts continues to shift toward the federal 
government, is it most effective and efficient for the federal government to assume the 
primary role in engaging the Whole Community, or is that role better suited to regional, 
state, or local governments?   
The Heritage Foundation believes ample capability should already exist, given the 
amount of resources expended to date, and therefore are calling for Congress to limit 
federal funding toward proven and demonstrated needs.25 The Foundation argues that 
low-risk states, cities, and infrastructure entities “have received more than enough federal 
funds to meet whatever minimal terrorism threat they may face.”26 Another disapproving 
analysis of DHS and homeland security funding comes from two scholars, Mueller and 
Stewart, who argue DHS lacks proper justification for expenditures based on threat 
probabilities and risk, and therefore does not achieve a positive return on investment.27  
The phrase “performance management system” is often associated with human 
resource departments and the evaluation and management of people. For the purpose of 
this research, “performance management system” is used in a generic sense to encompass 
all aspects of the DHS organizational enterprise, including processes, measurement, 
management, culture, planning, and its people. Many process improvement programs 
have gained prominence over the years in business to include quality, total quality 
management, six sigma, business process reengineering, theory of constraints, and lean to 
name just a few. All of these programs use various tools and techniques that provide a 
common approach and framework to improve organizational efficiencies and 
effectiveness. Performance management systems can chose to implement any one of 
                                                 
25 Are We Prepared?. Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants Since 9/11, Hearing Before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Emergency 
Management, Intergovernmental Relations and the District of Columbia, 113th Cong., (2013) (statement of 
Matt A. Mayer, Visiting Fellow, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The 
Heritage Foundation). 
26 Are We Prepared?,. Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants Since 9/11, Hearing Before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Emergency 
Management, Intergovernmental Relations and the District of Columbia, 113th Cong., (2013) (statement of 
Matt A. Mayer, Visiting Fellow, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The 
Heritage Foundation). 
27 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Terror Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and 
Costs of Homeland Security,” Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, 
IL, April 2011, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//MID11TSM.PDF. 
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these frameworks or a hybrid of approaches that best meets their needs and goals. The 
aim of this research is not to identify the specific tools and techniques that should be 
applied to the homeland security enterprise to improve performance. Rather, some 
performance management concepts are explored to show the potential of what could be 
accomplished given the enterprise devotes greater focus and attention to the matter.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is this: 
• What would a performance management model for use in state, local, 
tribal, or territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions look like?  
The secondary research questions are as follows: 
• What are the considerations and elements required for implementation? 
• What would be the challenges and implementation issues for such a 
model? 
During its 12-year history, a number of efforts for DHS to establish a viable 
performance measurement system have come and gone, leaving the organization unable 
to report the value of its programs to Congress. DHS’s emergency management 
performance grant and homeland security grant programs are two critical funding sources 
to states and urban areas. These two grant programs are under continuous pressure to 
show value for the investment, and each fiscal year they are at risk for reduced funding 
allocations. Because all states and urban areas rely on these federal funds to build and 
sustain capability for local programs, the ability to document and report outcomes will 
advance the programs’—and the funding’s—viability to congressional appropriators. If 
the programs’ success can be shown, DHS can argue for sustained funding through a 
difficult fiscal environment, and potentially for additional or special funding to address 
an identified gap in critical capability.   
Although 2013 was the first year DHS utilized both the State Preparedness 
Reports (SPR) and the state Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) 
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to compile the Presidential Policy Directive-8 mandated National Preparedness Report,28 
ample reviews and critiques of the current performance management system already 
existed. One of the primary findings from the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
was that many individual states lacked a comprehensive performance measurement 
system.29   
As currently developed, the data provided by the SPR and THIRA offer input to 
the National Preparedness Report and are a key input to DHS’ Annual Performance 
Report Priority Goal 3: Ensure Resilience to Disasters by Strengthening Disaster 
Preparedness and Response Capabilities.30 The significant drawbacks to the current 
assessment and report structures are the subjective nature of the assessments via 
qualitative measures, and the self-assessment construct. Refining the processes, measures 
(questions), and reporting tools would garner statistically significant information and 
contribute to the national preparedness capabilities assessment. 
As stated previously, one of the greatest challenges with current preparedness 
measurements is the lack of quantitative measures used to assess state and urban area 
programs’ progress. Developing metrics that meet the appropriate data standards for 
specificity, measurability, reliability, and timeliness—and that provide the critical 
information leaders and managers need to set priorities and direction—is perhaps the 
most difficult undertaking in the performance measurement system. It may be too broad a 
scope to accomplish in the given time. To address this challenge, a sample of well-
defined measurements should be developed as a guide for future researchers or program 
managers.   
                                                 
28 FEMA, National Preparedness Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2013), 2, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1916-25045-0015/npr2013_final.pdf. 
29 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress: 
Prepare, Respond, and Recover, October 1, 2012 through March 31, 2013 (Washington, DC: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013), 15, 17, 21. 
30 Department of Homeland Security, Annual Performance Report. Fiscal Years 2012–2014 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 50. 
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D. HYPOTHESIS 
A standardized performance management model can be successfully developed 
and implemented in SLTT jurisdictions that will inform executive decision-making 
across the homeland security enterprise and improve the overall effectiveness of 
preparedness activities through budget allocations. There are concerns, however, in 
realizing and sustaining the overall effort. The first concern is identifying valid, balanced, 
and relevant metrics that will provide reliable and actionable data. In tandem with this 
challenge is establishing the resources necessary to collect, analyze, and report the data. 
Implementation of a performance management system will likely require an initial 
investment of human capital as well as establishing training programs and providing 
technical assistance.   
E. RESEARCH METHOD AND SCOPE 
This research develops a conceptual model based on the identified shortfalls from 
current statutes and policies. A review is conducted of the policy and guidance directing 
federal agencies and all jurisdictions receiving federal aid to track and report performance 
metrics. In addition, prior attempts to satisfy the reporting requirements are analyzed. To 
begin the process of developing a performance management model, DHS and state 
policies, guidance, plans, and reports are reviewed to capture goals and requirements. 
Existing performance management models for organizations that conduct similar 
missions are evaluated for strengths and weaknesses as they apply to the homeland 
security organization.  
Through this analysis, along with the application of process improvement theory 
and techniques, a generic data collection model shows the alignment of SLTT strategic 
goals and objectives and performance measures to federal goals and objectives. The 
model accounts for the unique aspects of individual jurisdictions; the priorities and focus 
areas of each are based on threats, capabilities, and vulnerabilities requiring distinctive 
measurements to capture the required data.  
The goal of this research is to devise a performance management model that will 
serve SLTT jurisdictions in providing performance management information. In addition, 
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it endeavors to be flexible enough to address individual jurisdiction priorities while at the 
same time maintaining sufficient standardization, allowing the collected data to inform 
federal departments and agencies on progress and utilization of funds. This research 
effort serves as a starting point for the performance management system. Due to the 
complexity of the DHS mission and its many components, further research, analysis, and 
policy development will be required. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
There are three underlying reasons for researching a construct to measure the 
performance of homeland security programs. Foremost is the gain in efficiencies and 
effectiveness in SLTT homeland security programs through the collection and analysis of 
improved data and metrics. Efficiency and effectiveness undergird actual system 
performance and serve as the basis for measurement. The research will also provide a 
means for program directors to evaluate programmatic outcomes and measure progress 
toward strategic objectives. Additionally, the use of data can promote a more consistent 
application of policy and enhance transparency in resource allocation decisions. An 
established performance measurement framework will facilitate communication with all 
of the stakeholders, including state legislators and administrations, headquarters DHS, 
and Congress. 
There is increased recent scrutiny over how the SLTT jurisdictions expend their 
allocated funds.31 As previously stated, Congress has reduced the amount of federal grant 
dollars to SLTT programs due, in part, to DHS’s inability to report on the value created 
by the expenditure of funds. Congress may well decide to shift the fiscal burden of 
preparedness programs to state and local programs; however, that decision should not 
come as a result of an inability to report progress on established goals. A standardized 
approach to SLTT performance measurement could provide DHS a comparative analysis 
and reporting tool to inform Congress. 
                                                 
31 Preparedness What Has $29 Billion in Homeland Security Grants Bought and How Do We Know?, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, 111th 
Cong. (statement of Henry Cuellar, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, 
Preparedness and Response).  
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A performance management system can also be used by both state and federal 
program executives to justify program expenditures and inform critical resource 
allocation decisions to mitigate risks and fill resource gaps. Clear performance data will 
promote consistent application of policy and enhance transparency in resource allocation 
decisions. Moreover, an established performance measurement framework will facilitate 
communication with all stakeholders, including state legislators and administrations, 
headquarters DHS, and Congress. SLTT entities’ inability to track performance indicators 
is a systemic problem. As the DHS Office of Inspector General noted in its 2013 semi-
annual report, “Improvements are needed in the following areas: developing a 
comprehensive strategy with measurable objectives, developing a performance 
measurement system to assess emergency preparedness, and improve the performance 
measurement process.”32 
There are many potential benefits to incorporating a performance measurement 
framework in SLTT homeland security programs. Data derived from the framework will 
facilitate decision-making at all levels of management and will provide timely feedback 
on the efficacy of those decisions. Data also enables accountability; managers will gain 
insight into program processes and organizational compliance with policy, guidance, and 
directives. Metrics also serve as a tool to influence behavior and place direct attention on 
organizational priorities. 
In spite of all the challenges, FEMA states they can measure SLTT preparedness 
capability improvements to understand how the jurisdictions are meeting the National 
Preparedness Goal. FEMA asserts this is accomplished by comparing jurisdiction’s self-
identified capability gaps, via their annual Threat Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment and State Preparedness Reports, with their planned investment strategy 
outlined in the annual preparedness grant application package.33  
                                                 
32 Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, Semi-Annual Report to the 
Congress. 
33 Are We Prepared? Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants Since 9/11, Hearing Before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Emergency 
Management, Intergovernmental Relations and the District of Columbia, 113th Cong., (2013) (statement of 
statement of Timothy Manning, Deputy Administrator, FEMA for Protection and National Preparedness). 
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In testimony before the Senate Emergency Management Subcommittee, FEMA 
provided the following appraisal of the nation’s current preparedness:  
We are more secure and better prepared than we have been at any time in 
our history; we plan better, organize better, equip better, train better, and 
exercise better, resulting in improved national preparedness and resilience; 
we have built and enhanced capabilities by acquiring needed equipment, 
funding training opportunities, developing preparedness and response 
plans, exercising and building relationships across jurisdictional lines.34 
While all of these claims may be true, there is no understanding of how much better 
prepared the nation is, how much capability is required, and how much capability was 
developed over the past ten years. Although the capability to respond to a local disaster 
involves much more than the possession of assets, an audit of the assets acquired through 
federal grants has never been accomplished;35 therefore, an accurate evaluation of 
acquired capability can never be accomplished. Since 2009, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended DHS develop “clear, objective, and 
quantifiable capability requirements and performance measures.”36 DHS has initiated 
many attempts to establish an assessment system and implemented new reporting 
requirements to meet the goal of assessing national preparedness, but has yet to quantify 
the assessment through the development of performance measures. This inquiry explores 
and analyzes the various systems and processes put in place by DHS and attempts to 
determine the root causes for failure, in order to determine system performance 
adequately. 
G. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a review of the related literature and focuses on three main 
topics: the mandated requirements and historical efforts of DHS to implement a 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Are We Prepared?. Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants Since 9/11, Hearing Before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Emergency 
Management, Intergovernmental Relations and the District of Columbia, 113th Cong., (2013) (statement of 
Matt A. Mayer, Visiting Fellow, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The 
Heritage Foundation.)  
36 Maurer, National Preparedness, 8. 
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performance management system, the potential value a system can provide an 
organization, and the critical elements to consider in developing such a system. Chapter 
III takes a detailed look at the problem space and analyzes the laws and directives that 
dictate performance management requirements. It also reviews DHS’ attempts to 
implement performance management in their programs and identify the specific 
challenges that hinder its development. Finally, Chapter IV provides potential solutions 
to the identified challenges by developing a conceptual model that considers policy, roles 
and responsibilities, training, staffing, and reporting. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review identifies relevant sources concerning the requirement for and value 
of a performance measurement system within DHS. The sources fall into the following 
categories: the requirement for a performance management system; the value of a 
performance management system, a history of DHS initiatives to meet the requirement; 
and the elements of a successful performance management system.   
Overall, there are numerous resources from congressional testimony, Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, and other think tanks describing the requirement 
and need for a performance management system. There are also many resources 
providing guidance and theory in performance measurement systems, performance-based 
decision-making, metrics and measurement, and strategic planning. Finally, sources 
provide a reasonable account of the systems implemented by DHS over the past ten 
years, and their shortcomings. Detailed information regarding system capabilities and 
user interface, however, was not readily available. 
A. THE REQUIREMENT FOR A PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
Since the publication of HSPD-8 in 2003, public law has required government to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of their programs and operations. DHS has included 
these goals into their policy directives and struggled to implement and achieve them. The 
GAO has provided substantial documentation and reporting on these DHS deficiencies 
through reports (09-369, 09-651) and congressional briefs (11-51R) and testimony (13-
637T). These documents are more fully examined in Chapter III. The DHS Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) has also reported on and highlighted DHS’s difficulty to develop 
a performance management system. States and designated urban areas have received over 
$40 billion in DHS grant funding to develop preparedness and response capabilities. To 
better account for this spending, Public Law 110-53,37 which took effect in 2007, 
                                                 
37 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–53, 121 Stat. 
288–289 (2007). 
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directed an audit of every state’s federal preparedness grant funding program. The DHS 
OIG provided testimony before Congress in June 2013 that highlighted the lack of 
strategic planning and measurable goals by a significant number of states.38 Although the 
DHS OIG did not audit all programs, the sample of audits suggests states generally do not 
have an adequate system in place to measure and report on preparedness performance 
indicators. 
Think tanks such as The Cato Institute and RAND Corporation have also weighed 
in on DHS’s challenges to assess national preparedness. While RAND acknowledges the 
need for an assessment system, it also highlights the limits of measuring inputs to the 
disaster response system as a means of indicating predictable outcomes.39 RAND points 
out that it is difficult to assess human response systems with processes that are impossible 
to control and measure in a standardized way.40 In an opposing view, The Cato Institute 
argues that more than enough money has already been obligated to build capability in 
some homeland security endeavors, and it is now time to prioritize federal resources to 
the most critical programs and cut funding to those programs that should, by now, be 
mature.41   
B. THE VALUE OF A PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
While the Government Performance Results and Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) 
requires an assessment and annual performance report from most federal agencies, DHS’s 
performance is especially important. Director of the RAND Homeland and Security 
Defense Center Henry Willis, in his congressional testimony, outlines three aspects of the 
                                                 
38 Are We Prepared?, (statement of Anne L. Richards, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, DHS). 
39 Brian A. Jackson, The Problem of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: The Need for Assessing 
Response Reliability as Part of Homeland Security Planning (RAND Document No. OP-234-RC) (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 11, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP234.pdf. 
40 Brian A. Jackson, The Problem of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: The Need for Assessing 
Response Reliability as Part of Homeland Security Planning (RAND Document No. OP-234-RC) (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 11, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP234.pdf. 
41 David Rittgers, Abolish the Department of Homeland Security (Policy Analysis #683), 
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2011), 8–9, www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/abolish-
department-homeland-security-2011-09-08. 
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DHS mission that are critical to national security: 1) deciphering poorly understood 
threats, 2) mitigating the national consequences of these threats, and 3) developing an 
integrated approach to navigate the complexity of many DHS and external agencies.42 
Given the mandate to develop and put into operation a performance management 
system, the logical question that follows is: What will the agency gain from 
implementation? Resource constrained executives and managers will struggle to invest  
resources to a system when they do not know if return in savings or additional capability 
are worth the investment; “an expensive performance management system, even if it 
accomplishes something, may not accomplish enough to justify the expense.”43  
Independent research in three separate studies by Hendricks and Singhal; Powell, 
Eaton and Jarrell; and Leuschner all found evidence supporting improvements in 
economic and operational performance from the implementation of performance 
management systems in both public and private organizations.44 Eaton and Jarrell’s 
research indicated organizations with a highly developed or advanced system 
implementation attained even stronger performance levels.45 Hendricks and Singhal 
suggest that organizations implementing performance management systems at a level to 
receive award recognition also outperform their competition.46 This is supported by the 
                                                 
42 Henry H. Willis, Strengthening Strategic Planning and Management at DHS (RAND Testimony 
No. CT-387) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 4, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT300/CT387/RAND_CT387.pdf. 
43 James J. Heckman, Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey Smith, The Performance of Performance 
Standards (Working Paper 9002) (Cambridge, MA: The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002),11, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9002. 
44 Kevin B. Hendricks and Vinod R. Singhal, “Does Implementing an Effective TQM Program 
Actually Improve Operating Performance? Empirical Evidence from Firms That Have Won Quality 
Awards,” Management Science, 43 (September 1997), 1271, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2634637; Thomas 
C. Powell, “Total Quality Management as Competitive Advantage: A Review and Empirical Study,” 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jan 1995), 29, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0143-
2095%28199501%2916%3A1%3C15%3ATQMACA% 
3E2.0.CO%3B2-5; George S. Eaton and Sherry L. Jarrell, “The Effects of Total Quality Management on 
Corporate Performance: An Empirical Investigation,” The Journal of Business, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April 1998), 
298, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/209744; Kristin J. Leuschner, Are Performance-based 
Accountability Systems Effective?: Evidence From Five Sectors (RAND Research Brief No. RB-9549) 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Education, 2010), 2, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB9549.pdf. 
45 Eaton and Jarrell, “The Effects of Total Quality Management,” 298. 
46 Hendricks and Singhal, “Does Implementing an Effective TQM Program Actually Improve 
Operating Performance?,” 1271. 
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Bureaus of Economic Analysis and Labor Statistics, which shows organizations earning 
two Baldrige Awards for performance excellence demonstrate median growth in jobs 
nearly 20 times greater than matched industries and time periods.47 In addition, these 
organizations have seen a 92.6 percent increase in median revenue growth and a 67 
percent median growth in number of operational locations.48 
Eaton and Jarrell correlated long-term organizational benefits to an advanced state 
of performance improvement programs, suggesting “it takes time for an organization to 
reap the benefits of implementation.”49 Hendricks and Singhal’s research also indicates 
there are no negative performance indicators during the early implementation phase, 
despite the costs of program implementation, due to the offset of short-term benefits.50 
While research suggests organizations can benefit from implementing 
performance improvement programs, findings also illuminate the challenges to successful 
implementation. Powell’s research on the value of performance improvement programs 
found the results are not consistent for all implementers,51 and it is more challenging for 
large organizations to achieve performance improvement.52 Leuschner’s study suggests 
that systems’ specific design elements are critical to implementing the program 
successfully.53 These design elements are examined more thoroughly in the next section. 
C. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
A review of the literature highlighted six common, overarching elements critical 
to successfully implementing a performance management system. The six themes are: 
management, measurement, planning, communication, incentives, and employee 
                                                 
47  Baldrige Performance Excellence Program, “The Baldrige Criteria 101,” 
http://www.nist.gov/baldrige/publications/upload/The-Baldrige-Criteria-101.docx, Accessed June 6, 2015. 
48 “The Baldrige Criteria 101.” 
49 Eaton and Jarrell, “The Effects of Total Quality Management,” 298. 
50 Hendricks and Singhal, “Does Implementing an Effective TQM Program Actually Improve 
Operating Performance?,” 1271. 
51 Powell, “Total Quality Management,” 29. 
52 Ibid., 26. 
53 Leuschner, Are Performance-based Accountability Systems Effective?, 2. 
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involvement. These elements are addressed individually in this section, but most of them 
are interrelated, if not mutually supporting.  
1. Management 
Of the six themes, management is perhaps the most critical. Organizational 
leaders have much influence within the remaining five elements. They directly impact 
priorities, and play a key role in holding organizational departments accountable to the 
improvement process. The independent research of Powell; Rosett and Rosett; and 
Bourne Neely, Platts, and Mills all found management’s role to be a central factor in the 
success of performance improvement initiatives.54  
Light’s research identified poor management execution as a primary root cause of 
government failures,55 while Moynihan and Lavertu indicate management’s lack of 
involvement and use of performance information as significant contributors.56 Eaton and 
Jarrell provided a strong correlation between management methods and organizational 
performance improvement,57 while Powell’s research states executive commitment is 
more important to success than the various tools and techniques of an improvement 
program, such as benchmarking, training, and improved measurement.58 (Tools and 
techniques will be described in more detail in Chapter IV.) 
                                                 
54 Powell, “Total Quality Management as Competitive Advantage, 29; James G. Rosett and Richard 
N. Rosett, Characteristic of TQM: Evidence From the RIT/USA Today Quality Cup Competition (Working 
Paper 7241) (Cambridge, MA: The National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999),14, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7241; Mike Bourne et al., “The Success and Failure of Performance 
Measurement Initiatives: Perceptions of Participating Managers,” International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management 22 (2002): 1303, doi: 10.1108/01443570210450329. 
55 Paul C. Light, A Cascade of Failures: Why Government Fails and How to Stop It, (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institute, 2014), 8, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/07/14-cascade-failures-
why-government-fails-light. 
56 Donald Moynihan and Stephane Lavertu, Do Performance Reforms Change How Federal 
Managers Manage (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014), 8, http://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
papers/2012/10/11-management-moynihan. 
57 Eaton and Jarrell, “The Effects of Total Quality Management on Corporate Performance,” 298. 
58 Powell, “Total Quality Management as Competitive Advantage,” 29. 
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2. Measurement 
Metrics development is a critical component in assessing performance, and is 
perhaps one of the most challenging elements to implement effectively. Pyzdek describes 
measurement as “the assignment of numbers to observed phenomena according to certain 
rules.”59 These “rules” are important to ensure the numbers have relevancy and meaning, 
which will help managers conduct analysis and make decisions. Pyzdek identifies two 
fundamental properties that guide the collection of metrics: validity and reliability. Data 
validity ensures the “item measures what is intended” and reliability “ensures a 
measurement orders individual responses in the same way.”60  
Asch et al. describe the ideal measurement system as one containing elements 
from three categories: structure, process, and outcomes (though outcome measures in the 
area of preparedness are rare and difficult to ascertain).61 Structural measures have the 
advantage of being most responsive to policy changes but perhaps least related to 
outcomes.62 Process measures are most responsive to quality improvement efforts and 
are more directly related to outcomes.63 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith describe a fourth 
category of measurement—impact. Performance measures based on impacts are likely to 
be more controversial, depending on the data collection method, and are more costly to 
produce than outcome measures due to the additional time and analysis involved.64 
The GAO identified the “long-standing challenge of measuring and collecting 
accurate performance data”65 as the greatest shortcoming agencies face in assessing and 
reporting their GPRA-MA-mandated performance progress. Bourne et al. identified a set 
                                                 
59 Thomas Pyzdek, The Six Sigma Handbook, A Complete Guide for Green Belts, Black Belts, and 
Managers at All Levels (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 277. 
60 Ibid., 280. 
61 Stephen M. Asch et al., “A Review of Instruments Assessing Public Health Preparedness,” Public 
Health Reports, Vol. 120 (September–October 2005), 535, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC1497752/pdf/16224986.pdf, accessed April 7, 2015. 
62 Asch et al., “A Review of Instruments Assessing Public Health Preparedness,” 535. 
63 Ibid., 539. 
64 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, The Performance of Performance Standards, 11. 
65 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully 
Develop Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act (GAO-13-174) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2013), Report Overview, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654039.pdf. 
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of key challenges organizations face in developing a measurement system: poorly defined 
metrics, the lack of a highly developed information system, too many measures diluting 
the overall impact, and the need to collect more quantifiable versus qualitative results.66 
Additionally, Leuschner asserts that in order to collect performance data successfully, the 
associated metrics must be unambiguous and easy to observe.67 
Another challenge with developing actionable measures is the time lag between 
the observed measure and subsequent analysis, and a manager or leader’s need to make 
short-term decisions.68 Therefore, “if performance standards are to be put in place that 
motivate efficiency in the short-term, the performance management system needs to 
determine which short run measures are strongly related to long term efficiency 
criteria.”69 The conflict of collecting short-term management measures for expedient 
decision-making, while also trying to measure long-term progress of strategic goals is 
evident in DHS. Smith’s research reveals a disconnect between the GPRA-MA mandate 
and DHS’s solution, resulting in a bi-furcated measurement practice. DHS collects one 
set of short-tern, politically driven measures to satisfy GPRA-MA requirements, and a 
second set aligned with  its own internal agency measures.70 
A good measure should include clear standards, with the required data elements 
explicitly detailed.71 Davis et al. found that standardized measures are essential for 
assessing state and local organizations’ preparedness levels.72 Applying these standards 
to SLTT jurisdictions receiving federal grant program dollars can encourage and produce 
                                                 
66 Bourne, Neely, Platts, and Mills, “The Success and Failure of Performance Measurement 
Initiatives, 1289. 
67 Leuschner, Are Performance-based Accountability Systems Effective, 2. 
68 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith, The Performance of Performance Standards, 11. 
69 Ibid., 36. 
70 Teresa M. Smith, “Instilling a Culture of Accountability at the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS): Leveraging the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA-MA)” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 213–214. 
71 Asch et al., “A Review of Instruments Assessing Public Health Preparedness,” 535, 539. 
72 Lois M. Davis, Louis T. Mariano, Jennifer E. Pace, Sarah K. Cotton, and Paul Steinberg, 
Combating Terrorism: How Prepared Are State and Local Response Organizations? (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2006), 68, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG309.html. 
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greater accountability in the use of those funds.73  Without measurement standards, 
organizations attempt to fill duplicate information requests, which results in wasteful 
activity.74 In addition, inadequate standards can lead to poor investments that fail to 
improve outcomes or build capabilities to meet current and future needs.75 While 
preparedness standards are considered the backbone of accountability—which should 
lead to institutionalized and sustained preparedness—Canada’s research also warned that 
rigid standards can inhibit SLTT jurisdictions ability to find approaches that best meet the 
needs of each community based on unique geography, demographics, organizational 
structure and resources.76 
The abundance of available SLTT performance measures collected through State 
Preparedness Reports are predisposed to checklist items, yes or no questions, or Likert 
Scale assessment questions that use a subjective, self-reported three- or five-tier ranking 
scale. While there is value in collecting nominal or attribute data through these survey 
instruments, these data are considered the weakest form of measurement.77 
Jackson’s research shows that self-collection is a common means of data 
collection, and may be necessary to gain expert opinions.78 According to an American 
Journal of Public Health article, however, this technique yields biased outcomes with 
“ambiguous and uncertain preparedness goals, a lack of agreement about what the 
measures should aim at and how they should be interpreted, and a weak system of 
accountability for producing results.”79 The article goes on to state, “Measures often vary 
considerably across agencies and shift dramatically from year to year, leaving state and 
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local health officials, businesses, nonprofits, and citizens confused and perplexed by a 
maze of overlapping and sometimes contradictory requirements, checklists, and ideas 
about what constitutes preparedness.”80 
3. Strategic Planning 
The strategic planning process requires a focused and diligent effort to identify 
priorities and develop action plans that shape the nature and direction of an entity’s 
activities. But perhaps the most concise definition of strategy is “a plan for success.”81 
Bryson concludes that “strategic thought and action [emphasis added] are increasingly 
important to the continued viability and effectiveness of governments and is purposed to 
help organizations respond effectively to new situations.”82 
Organizational strategy is formed as a result of a deliberate planning process, and 
the resulting strategy defines how the organization intends to achieve its established 
vision. The strategy determines the best way to use available resources to achieve the 
planned goals or outcomes,83 and should contain few competing interests or 
requirements.84 DHS OIG frequently identifies strategic planning as a systemic 
deficiency throughout the SLTT jurisdictions; it has found many states lack an existing or 
current strategic plan. But, more importantly, most plans it did find lacked sufficient 
goals and objectives to drive management decision-making.85 
Bourne et al. identified several common shortfalls of strategic planning efforts 
that contribute to the failure of performance improvement initiatives: 
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• Lack of leadership and resistance to change 
• Unwillingness to commit required time and resources 
• Vision and strategy were not actionable 
• Strategy was not linked to resource allocation 
• Strategy was not linked to department, team, and individual goals 
(alignment) 
• Goals were negotiated rather than based on stakeholder requirements 
• Strategic plans are central to all organizational activities and involve all 
employees. The shortfalls identified by Bourne et al. are traits that 
contribute to the onset of the strategic plan’s failure. If mid-level managers 
and staff fail to see a connection between their individual or departmental 
efforts and the organizational strategy, there will be no incentive to meet 
the identified goals and objectives within the strategy.86 
4. Incentives 
Staff motivation is important if management wishes to incorporate a performance 
management system. Performance measures need to provide value to organizational staff 
as well as the program managers, either through process value or through an incentive 
mechanism that works. Performance measures can motivate improved performance by 
simplifying processes and procedures of routine staff functions, or through a system of 
linked rewards, benefits, or penalties.87 
Incentives should apply to individuals who or organizations that have control over 
the relevant inputs and processes, and should be meaningful to those being 
incentivized.88 The practice of tying rewards to accurately measurable performance or 
management, however, is rare.89 Metzenbaum’s research shows there is a correlation 
between the size of rewards or incentives and the staff’s willingness to accept or embrace 
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the system.90 Poorly designed incentives can give rise to unanticipated and undesired 
consequences. Too often, managers rely on the best available or easiest measure to 
collect instead of the best measure to determine performance.91 This can result in faulty 
analysis and ill-advised incentives. 
5. Communication 
Powell’s research found an “open organization” is critical to determine 
performance improvement initiatives’ successes or failures.92 Openness requires a free-
flowing dialogue between management, staff, and stakeholders. Light’s research shows 
that organizational missions that are not communicated and embraced can be easily 
undermined by rank corruption and unethical conduct; clearly defined missions that are 
embraced across the organization, however, can be effectively monitored and corrected 
through performance measurement and management.93 
Other research indicates organizational goals should be widely shared among all 
stakeholders.94 Strategic communications can reinforce the organization’s vision and 
create an environment in which employees are guided by the firm’s broader objectives. 
Additionally, a well-articulated vision that includes a focus on customer satisfaction is a 
key element of a good communication strategy.95 
6. Culture 
Organizational culture plays a strong role in the successful implementation and 
execution of a performance management system. Research by Vest and Gamm highlights 
two essential elements: a wholesale change in business practices and a fundamental 
change in culture. “The inability of many organizations to ensure transformation along 
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both these dimension [sic] may explain a number of previous failings of lauded 
[performance improvement] approaches to be viewed by employees and staff as anything 
different than a passing management fad.”96 Likewise, Moynihan and Lavertu’s research 
for the Brookings Institute found government-wide reform efforts are contingent upon 
bureaucratic behavior, which is difficult for reformers to control and observe, and 
ultimately results in limited successful outcomes.97 
Perhaps most important in the culture change is the deliberate focus on using the 
performance management system to drive improved performance through data-informed 
decisions.98 Asch et al. found, in order to achieve results in the process, a culture of 
accountability must be clearly identified in the performance management system. If 
performance measures are to have any impact on changing an organization’s culture, it 
must be clear who is responsible for implementing the changes implied by the measure.99 
Moynihan and Lavertu’s research showed the ability to link measures to actions may 
depend on the knowledge and skills of the person or team running a program.100 Training 
and critical thinking skills, in turn, can help managers interpret and analyze data.101 This 
is also supported by Rosett and Rosett’s research, which shows that those who implement 
a performance management system should have substantial training in scientific 
reasoning and should understand how to satisfy their customers. In addition, to facilitate 
process improvement efforts, employees may need some cross-training to become 
familiar with processes directly related to their functions.102 This training should include 
indoctrination to the organization’s vision.103 These findings are also evident in 
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Donnelly’s thesis, which found the self-assessment system used by DHS to evaluate 
SLTT jurisdictions lacks methodological validity and yields imprecise measurements.104 
D. HISTORY OF DHS’S RESPONSE TO THE PERFORMANCE MANDATE 
DHS has undertaken a number of initiatives to validate expenditures on the 
various emergency preparedness grant programs. Among these are the Capability 
Assessment for Readiness (1997), the Gap Analysis Program (2007), the State 
Preparedness Report (SPR) (2008), the Pilot Capability Assessment (2008), the Cost-to-
Capability Initiative (2008), National Incident Management System Compliance 
Assistance Support Tool (NIMSCAST) (2012-2013), The National Preparedness System 
(NPS) (2006–2008), and the Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) 
(2012). Today, the SPR and THIRA remain the core data collection tools for DHS to 
assess national preparedness. 
The GAO, however, notes that because “clear, objective, and quantifiable 
capability requirements and performance measures” have yet to be developed, DHS’s 
efforts to assess national preparedness will continue to falter.105 Among the critiques is 
the flexibility afforded to states to develop individual requirements and standards, 
preventing analysis that could identify differences and capability gaps.106  
In addition to the systems DHS developed and implemented over the years, there 
are a number of policy documents that guide DHS performance measurement. 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8 is the seminal document for national preparedness, 
which directed the development of the National Preparedness Goal, the National 
Preparedness System, and the National Preparedness Report.107 The DHS Strategic Plan, 
another key document, outlines the Department’s mission, vision, goals and 
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objectives.108 According to the Strategic Plan, state, tribal, territorial, and local entities 
will play a significant role in four of the five core mission areas: “preventing terrorism 
and enhancing security, secure and manage our borders, safeguard and secure cyberspace, 
and ensuring resilience to disasters.”109 The identified goals and objectives within the 
DHS Strategic Plan will serve as the basis for the development of performance metrics. 
In compliance with the GPRA, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 
directed DHS to “establish measurable readiness priorities and targets to include 
readiness metrics.”110 Additionally, it required “standards for preparedness assessments 
and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness for responding to major 
events.”111 Public Law 109–295 Section 649, also known as the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), included requirements to “establish a 
comprehensive system to assess, on an ongoing basis, the Nation’s prevention 
capabilities and overall preparedness, including operational readiness.”112 PKEMRA also 
requires the system to assess all related plans and strategies using “clear and quantifiable 
performance metrics, measures, and outcomes.”113 The assessments outcomes must be 
reported annually and will include, among other requirements, the overall results as well 
as the resources required to meet jurisdictional preparedness goals and the estimated 
costs.114 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Over the past ten years, DHS has implemented multiple programs designed to 
capture preparedness data. Those programs can be analyzed and compiled into a national 
assessment report as required by law.  
In 2015, the National Preparedness Report data consists of the following sources 
(reported as more than 450 total)115: 
• Open source materials 
• Solicitation for data from federal agencies 
• Federal agency, department, and coordination group engagement activities 
• State Preparedness Reports and Threat Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessments 
• Applying exercise, funding, and assessment criteria 
• Collaboration with 143 stakeholders  
Although the report contains many local success stories and anecdotal information 
from opinion surveys, it does not identify goals with measurable objectives or charts 
showing rate of progress. There is also little connectivity to other DHS strategic plans 
that would enable them to produce consistently reliable data. Measures should be focused 
on the critical few to ensure that staff members are not overwhelmed with data collection. 
Communication, incentives, and culture are the final three factors essential to 
establishing a successful performance management system. Management plays a key role 
in each of these areas as well. Managers and leaders at all levels must ensure the 
organizational vision, priorities, goals, and objectives are widely shared across the 
organization. This will promote a unified effort among personnel, allowing them to work 
toward the vision. Managers can also ensure staff are rewarded for meeting or exceeding 
interim and long-term goals. Although such a reward system can encourage unintended 
behavior and outcomes if not administered properly, perhaps the greatest reward is a 
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performance management system that provides value to the staff and management, and 
makes individual work tasks less complicated and more productive.  
Finally, the previously discussed factors discussed—a committed management, 
effective measures, robust strategic planning, valued incentives, and widely shared 
communications—are necessary for an organizational culture focused on performance 
results. Managers can further affect an organization’s culture by ensuring everyone is 
held accountable for performance results, while also giving the staff the necessary 
training to use the performance management system successfully. Perhaps the greatest 
cultural change in the organization will be managers’ use of data and information to make 
informed decisions at all levels. 
It is evident by the review of the literature that these factors can facilitate the 
implementation of a performance management system. An organization, however, must 
be “all in,” ensuring all the identified factors for success are aligned and integrated and 
not succumb to the common check box approach of planning, measuring, and reporting 
results as independent and isolated activities. It will require strong leadership, 
persistence, and time to change organizational culture. There is still much work left to do 
in order for DHS to comply with the GPRA-MA’s intent. 
A review of the literature also found no significant examples of highly successful 
performance management systems within the federal government, although research 
indicates the implementation of such a system can yield results. But what are the 
elements of a performance management system that could produce the expected results? 
Research indicates the most important factor in developing a successful performance 
management system is management’s role and interaction with the entire process. 
Mangers at all levels must be fully committed to the effort, from the allocation of 
resources to the daily use of performance data to inform decisions. Additionally, 
managers play an essential role in each of the five critical factors for successful 
implementation: strategic planning, measurement, incentives, communication, and 
culture. 
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Managers are integral to setting the organization’s vision, and for establishing 
how to achieve it. They must set an action plan that includes organizationally aligned 
goals and objectives, and they are accountable for allocating proper resources for 
achieving these goals and maintaining the performance management system once it is in 
place. Managers must also ensure the performance management system includes metrics 
that can measure progress toward the strategic vision. In order to provide actionable data, 
these measures require certain characteristics; measures should consider all aspects of the 
organization’s performance, to include structure, process, and outcomes. Outcome 
measures are considered the most prescient in determining progress. These measures, 
however, generally take longer to compile and also require metrics that can determine if 
the actions in place are taking the organization in the proper direction on a shorter 
interval. In addition, the research indicates measures should be well defined and 
integrated, and should not succumb to the common “check box” approach of planning, 
measuring, and reporting results as independent and isolated activities. Changing 
organizational culture will require strong leadership, persistence, and time. 
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III. THE PROBLEM SPACE DEFINED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of establishing a performance management system for the homeland 
security enterprise is evaluated through three central components: the driving forces and 
requirements for a performance management system, the initiatives taken by DHS to 
implement a system, and these efforts’ gaps and shortfalls. There are three main 
document categories influencing the design and implementation of a performance 
management system for grant programs. They are: public laws and federal regulations 
(which mandate the specific system requirements), DHS policy documents, and DHS 
strategy documents. In addition to the various assessment tools developed and 
implemented over the past 10 years, numerous policy, doctrine, and legislation efforts 
have also been enacted. 
B. PUBLIC LAW AND FEDERAL REGULATION 
1. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
of 1974 
The Stafford Act established “programs for the federal government to provide 
major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, 
individuals, and qualified nonprofit organizations.”116 Recently updated under the Sandy 
Recovery Improvement Act, the Stafford Act is the foundational guidance for all FEMA 
programs.  
While the Stafford Act offers little guidance for performance measurement, it 
holds the president responsible for establishing comprehensive standards to assess the 
effectiveness of federal major disaster and emergency assistance programs. In addition, 
annual reviews of major disaster and emergency preparedness at the federal and local 
levels will be conducted to assure programs’ maximum coordination and effectiveness, as 
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well as their consistency in policies for reimbursement of States.117 Finally, under 
Section 318, “the president is authorized to conduct audits of any assistance provided to 
state and local governments by the Stafford Act, to assure compliance with related 
regulations.”118 
Although disaster grant management and performance is not the focus of this 
research, there is benefit to be gained from collecting data and analyzing the performance 
of disaster response and recovery activities. The ability to analyze data on federal, state, 
and local efforts under the three types of federal disaster declarations (Fire Management 
Assistance Grants, emergencies, and major declarations) would inform the homeland 
security enterprise on a jurisdiction’s level of preparedness, and highlight capability gaps. 
This data would be instrumental in an overall performance management system because 
it measures outcomes of a variety of programs and processes. However, it is difficult to 
dedicate resources to track disaster response performance data during an incident due to 
resource constraints throughout the homeland security enterprise. There may be 
opportunities for collecting data from incident command system standard forms, archived 
briefings, and the emergency operations center incident management platform during the 
recovery phase or following the incident.  
2. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted, in part, to 
improve taxpayer confidence in the government. Specifically, the act examined the 
government’s capability “to achieve program results, improve federal program 
effectiveness and accountability, provide a framework for federal managers to focus on 
program results, service quality and customer satisfaction.”119 In addition, the GPRA 
served as a mechanism to inform congressional committees on forming budget 
allocations to various programs based on results or outcome data. 
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To accomplish these goals, the GPRA “established strategic planning, 
performance planning, and performance reporting for agencies to communicate progress 
toward achieving their missions.”120 The strategic plan is required for primary functions 
and operations,121 and the performance plan is required for each program activity and 
must be connected to the agency’s strategic plan.122 Finally, the annual report highlights 
each program’s actual performance compared to the stated goals for Congress and the 
president.123  
3. Homeland Security Act of 2002 
The Homeland Security Act established DHS from the consolidation of almost 
two dozen federal agencies with similar mission goals under a single department head. 
The new department would serve as the focal point to plan and coordinate activities 
necessary to protect the homeland against all natural or man-caused disasters.124 The Act 
also directed compliance with GPRA requirements by requiring each agency to provide 
an annual report and follow program performance requirements.125 
4. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic 
Incidents, 2003 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) established clear command 
and control for domestic incidents under the Secretary of Homeland Security. It also set 
guidelines for the individual agency actions during an emergency “to prepare for, respond 
to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”126 Finally, 
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HSPD-5 formally established a national incident management system (NIMS) and a 
national response plan (NRP) each required in the Homeland Security Act.  
NIMS provides standards to facilitate coordination and effectiveness for any 
entity, public or private, conducting operations during a domestic incident.127 
Additionally, the adoption of NIMS is required before any federal or state agency can 
receive federal funds for preparedness development.128 
5. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness, 
2003 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) established the national 
preparedness goal, which included the development of a system to collect and analyze 
data across the homeland security enterprise as allowed by law. The system’s overall goal 
is to provide an annual assessment of the Nation’s readiness and included requirements to 
establish measurable priorities as well as specific metrics and assessment standards.129 
HSPD-8 also called for all states to develop strategies that would prioritize 
requirements and assess program effectiveness. Although the strategies were to 
encompass an all-hazard approach, federal assistance to state and local entities remained 
terrorism centric.130  
6. Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006  
The Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) required 
FEMA establish a National Preparedness System. PKEMRA assigned eight components 
to the National Preparedness System to facilitate meeting the targets established in the 
National Preparedness Goal (the Goal)131 (Section C, Strategy Documents, Policy and 
Guidance, contains a more detailed discussion of The Goal). Of the eight components, 
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three have applicability to this research: target capabilities and preparedness priorities, a 
comprehensive assessment system, and reporting requirements.  
The target capabilities were to serve as “guidelines to define risk-based target 
capabilities for federal, state, local and tribal government preparedness.” The guidelines 
are to be specific, flexible, and measureable. Measuring current capability levels to 
compare against the established targets will identify the resources needed to attain the 
target levels of capability. The preparedness priorities should use a risk-based approach 
that will “appropriately balance the risk of all hazards with the resources required to 
prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the hazards.”132  
The National Preparedness System includes the task of establishing a 
comprehensive assessment system. The assessment system is mandated to measure 
performance and outcomes in meeting established target capabilities, the resources 
needed to achieve the designated target, and the performance of agencies and 
jurisdictions in the course of conducting actual operations as well as during exercises and 
training events.133 
The act also required that FEMA annually report on the Nation’s level of 
preparedness. The report would include information collected in the comprehensive 
assessment system along with an evaluation of federal resources and their capabilities 
available to respond to disasters and finally an estimate of the outlay needed to fund 
SLTT preparedness priorities.134 To inform the federal preparedness report, states are 
also required to submit an annual report. State assessments would include overall 
compliance with federal plans and strategies, a current capability assessment and an 
estimate of funding needed to meet preparedness goals.135  
The PKEMRA bolstered FEMA’s status as a federal agency within DHS by 
designating the Administrator as the President’s principal advisor for all emergency 
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management matters and could be designated a Cabinet member during a disaster.136 In 
addition, the PKEMRA restored to FEMA the Directorate of Preparedness and the 
functions of emergency alert, continuity, and grant management programs.137 
7. GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 
The 1993 GPRA was updated via the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA)138 
and remains the federal government’s principal performance management guidance. It 
provided additional specificity to the strategic and performance-planning requirements 
for affected departments.139 In addition, the revisions increased agency consultation with 
congressional committees in developing and updating goals and objectives. Consideration 
was also given to external environmental factors affecting agency performance, along 
with the interaction and collaboration with other agencies to achieve performance goals 
and objectives.140 The stated purposes of the GPRAMA are to: 
• Improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the 
federal government, by systematically holding federal agencies 
accountable for achieving program results 
• Improve program performance by requiring agencies to set goals, measure 
performance against those goals and report publicly on progress 
• Improve federal program effectiveness and public accountability by 
promoting a focus on results, service quality and customer satisfaction 
• Help federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they 
plan for meeting program goals and by providing them with information 
about program results and service quality 
• Improve congressional decision-making by providing more information on 
achieving statutory objectives and on the relative effectiveness and 
efficiency of federal programs and spending 
• Improve internal management of the federal government, and 
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• Improve usefulness of performance and program information by 
modernizing public reporting.141 
The GPRAMA is the new foundation for developing more effective and efficient 
government agencies by creating an approach that allows managers and leaders to make 
informed decisions and set policy based on data and analysis. 
8. Code of Federal Regulations Title 44, Emergency Management and 
Assistance 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 44 provides the principle set of rules and 
regulations governing emergency management and assistance.142 The regulation’s stated 
central purpose is to “foster intergovernmental partnership and strengthen federalism by 
connecting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions into the preparedness 
system.”143 
CFR 44 underscores the monitoring and program performance requirements for 
all FEMA grantees. Grantees are responsible for complying with all applicable federal 
requirements and ensuring they meet established performance goals. Grantees are also 
responsible for submitting annual performance reports that compare actual 
accomplishments to the established objectives and quantify output analysis if 
appropriate.144 In addition to the annual performance reports, a closeout report is required 
when the federal agency determines all required grant work has been completed.145 
Finally, the federal agency may consider a subgrantee “high-risk” if there is a history of 
unsatisfactory performance due to cost overruns or failure to meet program objectives. 
Under these circumstances, the grantor may restrict grant fund distribution, and require 
additional and more detailed reporting and increased monitoring.146 
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9. Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  
The 9/11 Commission Act implemented recommendations made by the 9/11 
Commission, and strengthened the incident command systems’ use. The act (Pub. L. No. 
110–53) also created additional block grant funding for state, local, and tribal 
governments under the Homeland Security Grant Program. This program established four 
new grant programs to counter the terror threat: the Urban Area Security Initiative, the 
State Homeland Security Grant Program, the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 
Program and the Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program.147 
The act also provided accountability requirements for all new and existing 
recipients of grant funding. The first mandate was an agency programmatic and financial 
review to be conducted by DHS at least once every two years. This review will ensure 
grant funds were used according to all applicable laws, guidance, and plans, and will 
examine how the funds enhanced grantee capabilities.148 DHS is also mandated to 
conduct a performance assessment (as established under PKEMRA) to ensure grant funds 
are appropriately used to meet established target capabilities and preparedness 
priorities.149 The second mandate was an Office of Inspector General Performance audit 
to ensure the effective and appropriate use of grant funds. All states receiving federal 
grant funds receive at least one audit every seven years. In addition, sample audits are 
conducted based on the size of the grant and the recipient’s past performance history.150 
10. Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness  2011 
Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) is the seminal document for national 
preparedness, directing the development of four key parts: a National Preparedness Goal; 
National Preparedness System (NPS); a series of integrated frameworks covering each of 
the five core mission areas (prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery); 
and a National Preparedness Report (NPR). PPD-8’s purpose was to “strengthen the 
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security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats 
that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.” PPD-8 specifies that the 
responsibility for national preparedness resides with all levels of government, the private 
and nonprofit sectors, and individuals, thus promoting the concepts of “all of Nation” and 
“whole community” prevalent throughout DHS guidance documents.151 Finally, PPD-8 
directs a comprehensive approach “to measure the operational readiness of national 
capabilities with clear, objective, and quantifiable performance measures.”152 
Furthermore, PPD-8 directed the NPS to: build and sustain capabilities; include a 
system of integrated planning frameworks; provide resource and equipment guidance; 
support community and business preparedness planning efforts; and develop a 
methodology to measure operational readiness with clear, objective and quantifiable 
performance measures.153  
C. STRATEGY DOCUMENTS, POLICY AND GUIDANCE 
1. National Strategy for Homeland Security of 2007 
The stated purpose of the National Strategy for Homeland Security “is to guide, 
organize, and unify homeland our Nation’s homeland security efforts. It provides a 
common framework by which our entire Nation should focus its effort.”154 One of the 
tenants within the strategy is the delineation of national response roles and 
responsibilities. The principle of disaster response is scalability but that “all incidents 
should be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible.”155   
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The strategy supports the role of the community and individual by identifying the 
need to create a culture of preparedness. “Citizens, communities, the private sector and 
non-profit organizations each perform a central role in homeland security”156  
Finally, the strategy calls for a Homeland Security Management System led by 
federal government agencies but is dependent on SLTT jurisdictions for ultimate success. 
The management system is comprised of four distinct phases: 1) guidance, to include 
plans, policies, guidance, and doctrine; 2) planning, to include strategic, operational, and 
tactical; 3) execution, through operational response or exercises and; 4) assessment and 
evaluation, to identify both successful practices and areas for improvement that will 
inform potential changes to future guidance and plans.157 
2. National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG) Sept 2007 
The vision of the NPG supports the collaboration among all levels of government 
and stresses the importance of the private sector, citizens, and nongovernmental 
organizations.158 The guidelines establish a framework of plans, strategies, and systems 
into the National Preparedness System and include a risk-based, all-hazards, and 
capabilities-based approach to preparedness.159 A capability is defined as “the 
combination of elements required to deliver the desired outcome.”160 The NPG offers 37 
capabilities within the primary mission areas of prevention, response, protection, and 
recovery and includes five common capabilities across all mission areas. A desired 
outcome is defined for each capability as a means to begin the measurement and 
assessment process.161 The NPG outlined a process to include standards and specific 
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metrics were in development at the time of publication but it never “established 
measurable capability requirements for federal and SLTT preparedness efforts.”162 
3. National Preparedness Goal of 2011 
The National Preparedness Goal (the Goal) was the first document released in 
support of PPD-8. The Goal consists of a vision, capabilities, and priorities for national 
preparedness.163 
The Goal is described as “the Nation’s approach to preparing for the threats and 
hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States” and defines 
success as “a secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole 
community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats 
and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”164 The Goal contains 31 core capabilities that are 
described as the essential elements necessary to successfully execute the “five core 
mission areas of: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.”165 Of the 
31 capabilities, three are common to all five mission areas, while the remaining 28 are 
specifically aligned to one or more mission areas.166 Each core capability has one or 
more capability targets identified as the performance threshold(s) for each core 
capability. These target capabilities are the basis for developing future performance 
metrics that will be used to track national preparedness progress.167 These core 
capabilities replaced the Target Capabilities List established in 2007. 
                                                 
162 GAO, FEMA Has Made Limited Progress, 31. 
163 GAO, FEMA Has Made Progress but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, 89, Table 4. 
164 FEMA, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 
1, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-
9470/national_preparedness_goal_2011.pdf. 
165 FEMA, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 
1, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-
9470/national_preparedness_goal_2011.pdf. 
166 FEMA, National Preparedness Goal, 2, Table 1. 




4. National Preparedness System, 2011 
The NPS is intended to be an organized process for the whole community to 
conduct preparedness activities and achieve the NPG. The NPS currently has six parts: 
• Identifying and Assessing Risk—the collection of information to identify 
threats and hazards along with their respective impacts. The national 
assessment is based on the combination of the Threat Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) conducted by SLTT 
jurisdictions and the Strategic National Risk Assessment conducted by 
federal agencies 
• Estimating Capability Requirements—developed through planning 
factors that use the threat data to determine specific resources needed to 
develop the capabilities necessary to achieve the stated outcome.   
• Building and Sustaining Capabilities—planning to prioritize the 
identified capability gaps and sustaining existing capabilities.  
• Planning to Deliver Capabilities—coordination and involvement with 
the whole community. 
• Validating Capabilities—exercise and test plans and capabilities to test 
gaps in preparedness and measure progress. 
• Reviewing and Updating—a regularly scheduled review and update of 
jurisdictional capabilities, resources and plans.168 
The NPS attempts to integrate preparedness activities that have already been 
accomplished into a system that brings in new tools and processes to achieve necessary 
outcomes during emergencies and disasters. The six-step methodology builds on 
PKEMRA by enabling states to collaborate across the whole community for national 
preparedness.169 The NPS validates the capability needed by a risk assessment, which 
informs new or current capabilities. It guides states to develop a collaborative, holistic 
strategy. Each state is mandated to aggregate their own Threat and Hazard Identification 
and Risk Assessment (THIRA) to the regional and then national level.   
                                                 





5. Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201 (The Threat Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment), 2013 
The Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) describes a 
“standard process for identifying community-specific threats and hazards and setting 
targets for each core capability,” and “includes estimation of resources needed to meet 
the capability targets.”170 The THIRA identifies the specific “natural, technological, 
accidental and malicious causes”171 of disasters for each state and territory, and specifies 
established capabilities to mitigate or respond to the hazard, as well as the shortfalls. 
These shortfalls or gaps should be linked to the jurisdiction’s funding goals and 
objectives. However, it is impractical for every state and territory to counter every known 
threat or hazard. Therefore, the risk or probability of the threat occurring is also critical to 
prioritizing the desired capability development. 
The THIRA is a relatively new DHS requirement. “FEMA officials stated that the 
THIRA process is intended to facilitate the development of a set of national capability 
performance requirements and measures.”172 “Such measures, however, are not yet 
developed. Until clear, objective, and quantifiable capability requirements and 
performance measures are developed, the NPS will not be able to identify and close its 
resource and capability gaps.”173 
6. Strategic and Performance Plans 
a. Strategic Plans 
Required by the GPRAMA, strategic plans require updates at least every four 
years, with congressional consultation every two years. The extracted elements that 
should be included in the strategic plan include: 
                                                 
170 Department of Homeland Security, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, Second Edition. (Washington, DC, 2013), 1, 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/8ca0a9e54dc8b037a55b402b2a269e94/CPG201_htirag_2nd_edition.pdf. 
171 Robert Bach (thesis advisor), in discussion with the author, February 13, 2015. 
172 Maurer, National Preparedness, 12. 
173 Ibid., 13. 
 48 
• A comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and 
operations of the agency 
• General goals and objectives, including outcome-oriented goals, for the 
major functions and operations of the agency 
• A description of how to achieve the goals and objectives, including 
operational processes and resources required and cross agency 
coordination 
• Identification of the key external factors that could significantly affect the 
achievement of the general goals and objectives 
• Establishment of a process to evaluate program performance174 
DHS’s 2014–2018 Strategic Plan maintains a “five-mission structure: (1) prevent 
terrorism and enhance security, (2) secure and manage our borders, (3) enforce and 
administer our immigration laws, (4) safeguard and secure cyberspace, and (5) strengthen 
national preparedness and resilience.”175 The two primary identified factors are unity of 
effort and stakeholder engagement.176 In addition, DHS established a four-year plan to 
improve its ability to collect, analyze, and report on data sources, referred to as the 
Analytic Agenda. The outcome of this effort aims to improve DHS’s ability to employ 
analytically informed decisions and operate under data-driven management.177 
The strategic plan should be the seminal document to answer the questions: What 
does it mean to be prepared? What are the attributes of a prepared homeland security 
enterprise? How much preparedness is enough? The biggest challenge for determining 
preparedness in a dynamic and changing environment is that we often do not know what 
preparedness is, but we know what it is not when it fails to meet customer 
expectations.178 This leads to perhaps the even more difficult questions: What do we 
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need to be prepared for? How long do we have to be prepared—what are the short and 
long term issues? What agencies or capabilities are the first, second, and third priorities 
for funding? “The answers to all of these questions are fundamentally matters of strategy; 
what it means to be “prepared” can only be understood in the context of one’s 
strategy.”179 
The challenges of overcoming dynamic and evolving threats and hazards are 
great. Effective and efficient solutions to these challenges are best met by setting 
priorities: “What does the community need to prepare for? What resources are required in 
order to be prepared? What action could be employed to lessen or eliminate the 
threat?”180 For these reasons, good strategic planning—defining the organization’s 
direction for the future181—is critical.182 “The complexity, difficulty, and importance of 
the preparedness system underscore the importance of a strategic plan in the 
development, implementation, and integration of the system.”183 
b. Performance Plans 
The performance plan’s purpose is to establish intermediate goals for the current 
and next fiscal year that will move the organization closer to meeting their strategic 
objectives. The relevant elements of the performance plan are: 
• Identify the program activities, regulations, expenditures, policies, and 
other activities contributing to each performance goal 
• Identify a lead official for each performance goal, responsible for 
coordinating the efforts to achieve the goal 
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• Establish performance indicators with quarterly targets to assess overall 
progress 
• Identify major management challenges toward meeting goals and 
objectives 
• Express goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form 
• Identify the program activities, regulations, policies, and other activities 
that contribute to each performance goal, both within and external to the 
agency 
• Identify the officials responsible for each performance goal 
• Establish a balanced set of performance indicators to be used in measuring 
or assessing progress toward each performance goal, including customer 
service, efficiency, output, and outcome indicators 
• Compare actual program results with the established performance goals184 
c. Analysis 
The DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014–2018 provides essential 
information to develop a performance measurement system that can effectively inform 
decision-makers to shape resource allocations and determine progress. Performance 
measures are defined as the “metrics used to ascertain actual performance against target 
levels identified for each core capability; by design, they are clear, objective, and 
quantifiable.”185 The strategic plan communicates the department’s vision, mission, 
goals, and objectives, and illustrates selective performance measures with their planned 
targets over a four-year period.  
The FY 2012–2014 Annual Performance Report (APR) provides a full list of 
performance measures used for each objective in the strategic plan. The report indicates 
the need for a strong review process to ensure individual measures are relevant and 
necessary when compared to retired and new measures. The APR, however, fails to 
integrate or “roll up” the individual measures within each objective to assess overall 
success. Likewise, the individual objectives are not integrated to assess the aligned goal.  
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In addition, the graphic display of relevant trends in the APR would provide a 
quick performance assessment. In one specific case, the stated performance of the 
Compliance rate for Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism showed a steady 
negative trend over a five-year period and was subsequently retired, but lacked 
explanation for the measurement change.186 Analysis of the report shows 33 percent of 
the total measures indicated performance targets of 94 percent or greater level and 20 of 
the measures stated performance targets of 100 percent.187 Even though the target 
performance level may be 100 percent, it would be instructive to understand how many 
resources would be required to achieve that level of performance, and if perfection is 
necessary, or even a reasonable expectation. 
D. DHS ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS 
Congress has demanded accountability from the homeland security enterprise 
through performance measurement; however, DHS has struggled to develop a reliable 
measurement system that could account for the homeland security enterprise’s evolving 
nature. In order to comply with the performance assessment requirements, DHS has 
established numerous systems designed to measure capabilities, readiness, and 
preparedness: the State Preparedness Reporting System (SPR), the National Incident 
Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool (NIMSCAST), the Grants 
Reporting Tool (GRT), the Logistics Capability Assessment Tool (LCAT), the Gap 
Analysis Program (GAP), and the Cost-to-Capability (C2C) pilot program. FEMA has 
yet to implement the five-step central repository for national preparedness data—known 
as the Comprehensive Assessment System—called for in 2003’s HSPD-8, and later in 
2006 with the PKEMRA. The following sections summarize the current systems 
employed to address FEMA’s performance assessment requirement. 
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1. Capabilities Assessment for Readiness 
The Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) was the first attempt to develop 
a nationwide assessment of emergency management performance. The CAR was created 
in 1997 in response to a congressional inquiry that called for “a national set of emergency 
management performance criteria for FEMA grant recipients.”188 CAR was a one-time 
assessment of capabilities completed over a three-month period through self-assessments 
by 56 states and territories. The “CAR lacked controls for accurately validating self-
reported assessment data, which limited the reliability—and therefore the value of—the 
data.”189 
2. Gap Analysis Program 
The GAP began in 2007 and was designed to assess and improve the response 
readiness of federal, state and local entities by assessing the gaps in disaster-response 
capabilities. Initially, FEMA assessed the response of states and territories subject to a 
Category 3 hurricane. The GAP looked at seven critical response missions of the 37 
target capabilities, including: “debris removal, commodity distribution, evacuation, 
sheltering, interim housing, fuel capacity along evacuation routes, and communications, 
but did not include comprehensive information for activities related to all 37 target 
capabilities.”190 In 2009 GAP was expanded nationwide to better assess overall 
readiness.191  
The GAP’s advertised strengths included a standard tool to estimate the 
capabilities and resources needed for an effective response that allowed input from state 
and local emergency managers and first responders. The Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) assessed medical needs from data provided by states and 
territories. Finally, the GAP utilized a standardized data collection and analysis tool 
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(DCAT) that measured preparedness through readiness indicators and quantifiable 
resource data that could be used with any hazard (not just hurricanes).192 
It also ultimately provided states flexibility to use scenarios tailored to their 
unique risks, such as hurricanes or earthquakes. Several limitations of the program, 
however, were also identified. First, states lacked adequate resources to input accurate 
capability information into the GAP. Next, process lacked standardization resulting in an 
unbalanced analysis across the participating states, which added uncertainty to the results. 
Finally, capability requirements could not be determined due to the lack of a national 
planning system and the inability of differing levels of government to collaborate. As a 
result, the GAP was no longer considered a solution to the national preparedness 
assessment challenge.193 
3. State Preparedness Report 
First developed and submitted in 2008, the SPR is a PKEMRA-mandated 
reporting requirement. All 56 states and territories were mandated to complete the report 
as a condition to receive homeland security grant funding. The SPR assesses current 
capability levels, identifies unmet target capabilities, and assesses resource gaps. States 
continue to submit the SPR as a grant requirement,194 however, “FEMA could not use 
information in the first reports to compare capability gaps between states because states 
did not report information using common metrics,  and data were not always available to 
consistently complete the report.”195  
The Federal and State Preparedness Reports each have an annual requirement. 
The federal report is used to classify the Nation’s level of preparedness and assesses how 
well federal assistance supports national preparedness efforts and resources. The federal 
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report is submitted to appropriate congressional committees.196 Each report is required to 
assess state compliance with national plans and strategies, identify current and target 
capability levels, and list the resource gaps necessary to meet the target capabilities based 
on national priorities.197 
The SPR is not considered an assessment; FEMA uses the data from the SPRs, 
along with other data and reports, to create the National Preparedness Report.198 In 
2010, FEMA improved the reporting process by developing a web-based survey and 
included standardized measures to assess progress in achieving the Target Capabilities 
List. Since 2010, however, the Target Capabilities List has been abandoned, and replaced 
by the National Preparedness Goal’s 31 Core Capabilities, making comparative analysis 
difficult.199 Additionally, the reports offer limited data reliability due to the non-standard 
self-reporting process.200 FEMA officials say “they have taken steps to address these 
limitations; and they believe, overall, the data they have are reliable.”201 
4. National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance 
Support Tool 
The National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool 
(NIMSCAST) provides a web-based, self-assessment instrument for federal and SLTT 
governments to evaluate and report their achievement of National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) implementation activities. It is a self-assessment system used to identify 
successes and shortfalls in compliance, best practices, and technical assistance from the 
National NIMS Integration Center. NIMSCAST established baseline measures for 
compliance with NIMS standards, primarily through yes-or-no performance-based 
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questions. NIMSCAST was nationally deployed and included users at all levels of 
government.202  
Challenges with the system include a lack of standardization on the entities or 
jurisdictions within each state that must report NIMS implementation. Also, because 
NIMS is a self-assessment process the resulting outputs were deemed unreliable.203 
NIMSCAST was scheduled to be included in the PrepCAST system but was unsupported 
due to a lack of funding. It is unclear how NIMSCAST will integrate with future efforts 
to measure target capabilities.204 
5. Pilot Capability Assessment 
The Pilot Capability Assessment’s (PCA) purpose was to create and test a 
systematic, repeatable assessment methodology that could be developed into a 
capabilities assessment tool, used to create a national picture of preparedness. Moreover, 
the PCA assessed a region’s progress toward self-defined targets for activities linked to 
the Target Capabilities List. A web-based version of the PCA was piloted in 10 states and 
an on-site assessment was piloted in six states. However, because “the PCA was labor-
intensive and did not generate meaningful data,”205 primarily due to self-reporting 
limitations and the associated data reliability issues, the project did not progress beyond 
the initial pilot.206 
6. Grants Reporting Tool 
The GRT is a reporting system designed as a quality assurance system rather than 
as a preparedness assessment system. Its goal was to monitor financial and programmatic 
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information from SLTT jurisdictions for grants and cooperative agreement awards. The 
information gathered from the tool enables FEMA “to evaluate applications and make 
award decisions, monitor ongoing grant performance and manage the flow of federal 
funds, and appropriately close out grants or cooperative agreements.”207 The GRT 
collects information from each grant program and tracks progress in developing 
capabilities.208  
Since 2004, the GRT has tracked the grant life cycle of 21 grant programs and 
collected data on how SLTT governments planned to use grant program dollars and how 
the money was actually spent. However, using this data to assess preparedness 
capabilities will be difficult because capability improvements are not part of the data 
collection regime. Data reliability is an issue with GRT due to self-reporting limitations 
of the web-based program and the lack of standards to mitigate individual interpretation 
and provide consistency. GRT reports are completed on a biannual basis to FEMA for 
monitoring and oversight.209 
7. Logistics Capability Assessment Tool 
The Logistics Capability Assessment Tool (LCAT) was designed as another self-
assessment tool to determine logistical capabilities for disaster planning and operations 
and the identification of areas needing improvement. The tool was not intended to 
provide an assessment of collective capabilities since local differences prevent evaluation 
at the regional or national level.210 LCAT’s pilot program was completed in FY 2010 and 
is still available for use by the request of SLTT jurisdiction through FEMA’s regional 
technical assistance program. 
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8. Cost-to-Capability Pilot Program 
The Cost-to-Capability (C2C) initiative was a pilot program launched in 2008 to 
help FEMA and localities better target and measure federal grant fund. The C2C used the 
National Planning Scenarios as a basis for its framework. Data was derived from the 
state’s self-assessments and estimates on current and future capabilities. Because the 
assessment lacked standardization and reliable metrics reliable comparisons could not be 
made and proved ineffective.211 FEMA has not yet developed these metrics. 
The C2C initiative utilized broad representation from SLTT government officials 
to develop a data collection system intended to measure the effectiveness of several 
programs.212 The initiative, known as the Reporting Requirements Working Group, 
worked with FEMA to find areas where current data collection efforts could be 
combined. In their final report, they concluded surveys best meet stakeholder 
requirements for a data collection tool.213 
The C2C program “was intended to optimize the impact of homeland security 
grant dollars on preparedness efforts and measure the return on investment grants.”214 
However, in July 2009, FEMA suspended the collection of data from SLTT jurisdictions. 
As a result, the C2C initiative was suspended in November 2009.215 
The GAO noted a limitation of C2C: FEMA did not require that grantees utilize 
C2C, which limited the amount of information collected and resulted in questionable 
overall value.216 Thus, FEMA could not “collect comprehensive information to assess 
how grant funds have improved capabilities.”217 Additionally, C2C lacked a standardized 
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formula for determining necessary costs, and users assessed their needs using individual 
judgment.218 
9. Comprehensive Assessment System 
In December 2008, FEMA provided plans to establish the Comprehensive 
Assessment System (CAS) by May 2010, to “function as a central repository for national 
preparedness data.” The system was to “integrate data from prior reports and legacy 
assessment systems.”219 The CAS was intended to “assess the nation’s prevention 
capabilities and overall preparedness, including operational preparedness.” The 
assessment system was tasked to measure: compliance with the national plans and 
strategies; capability levels; resource needs; and, finally, the performance of training, 
exercises, and operations. PKEMRA mandated that specific plans and strategies within 
each component of the National Preparedness System “should be updated with clear and 
quantifiable performance metrics, measures, and outcomes.”220 
The CAS (as shown in Figure 1) was designed to integrate data, conduct analysis, 
and report on the state of national preparedness. It was not defined as a new data 
collection tool, IT platform, or automated calculator. To date, data requirements and 
metrics have yet to be defined. Although there is plenty of data available to collect, such 
as the SPR, Grant Reporting Tool, Logistics Capabilities Assessment Tool, and data from 
exercises and disaster response after action reports, it is unclear how the data can be 
integrated and analyzed to provide meaningful and actionable information to decision 
makers.  
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Figure 1.  GAO Representation of the Comprehensive Assessment System221 
The primary function of CAS, as illustrated in Figure 1, is a framework that 
brings together multiple sources of data based on established metrics. It appears the CAS 
will serve merely as single portal to access the various systems and tools already in place 
but does not integrate the information or provide any additional analysis capability. It 
should be noted the Gap Analysis Program, Cost-to-Capability Program, and the National 
Incident Management Systems Compliance Assistance Support Tool all listed in Figure 1 
are no longer active programs. Best practices and lessons learned are two other existing 
programs not identified that FEMA is considering including in the new system.222  
10. National Preparedness System 
The NPS was a web-based system that was field tested in ten states through 
January 2008. The NPS assessed jurisdictions against the 37 TCL target capabilities and 
was intended to guide users through a comprehensive planning and assessment process 
that clarified roles, informed investments, and supported strategic decision-making. One 
of TCL’s key benefits was that it would determine capabilities gaps, where they were 
needed, at what level they were required to function, and what the current capability 
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levels were in high-risk locations. The ability to conduct this type of analysis could 
inform appropriators on how much funding should be allocated by the federal 
government to SLTT jurisdictions and how long they should be funded.223 However, “the 
NPS was discontinued because it was time consuming and did not produce meaningful 
data. Because it was only piloted, the NPS did not generate meaningful preparedness 
information from the data collected. FEMA spent nearly $15 million on the system for 
2006, 2007, and 2008 before it was discontinued.”224  
11. The Preparedness Compliance Assessment System Tool (PrepCAST) 
PrepCAST is a system designed to help unify FEMA’s information collection 
systems. PrepCAST is not designed to be an information collection tool, but rather a 
platform that houses information collection tools. As the PrepCAST system is further 
developed, it will allow users to access the various DHS reporting tools through the 
common portal using a single set of login credentials. Although the initial version of 
PrepCAST contains only a single application, the SPR, FEMA plans to expand the 
system to incorporate additional collections, including NIMSCAST, in the future.225  
E. ANALYSIS OF DHS ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS 
Since 1997, FEMA has attempted to implement a comprehensive assessment 
system that captures and reports on national capabilities and preparedness. As reviewed 
in this chapter, DHS and FEMA have developed over ten programs to accomplish this 
task and, as of this writing, there is no specific project or program identified to 
accomplish this goal. 
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The review of each system reveals several recurring themes related to the reported 
challenges and shortcomings: self-assessing and self-reporting; lack of a comprehensive 
or all-inclusive management system; no established metrics or standards; a labor 
intensive process and a lack of resources to manage the system; and, finally, inconsistent, 
inaccurate, and unreliable data. 
The THIRA and SPR processes are currently the two primary avenues for SLTT 
jurisdictions to provide input into the National Preparedness Report. Although there is no 
current requirement, the THIRA and SPR are scalable to allow jurisdictions below the 
state level to participate. The state reports are designed to track progress toward meeting 
preparedness goals. The reports are also used to justify requests for grant funding by 
identifying capability gaps and the plan or strategy to use grant funds to build or develop 
the lacking capabilities. The justification is included in the state grant application, along 
with specific outcomes as a result of the grant investment.226 
In 2010, FEMA responded to a DHS OIG report on preparedness that refuted the 
OIG assertion that FEMA has not substantially improved its assessment process of SLTT 
jurisdictions. FEMA argues the SPRs have “substantially improved their assessments of 
capabilities/readiness at the national, state, and local levels.”227 While the National 
Preparedness Report has emerged as the preeminent document to assess national 
preparedness, there are still gaps in data that affect the report’s ability to impact decisions 
on strategy and priorities. 
To comply with the annual requirement to report on the state of national 
preparedness to the president, FEMA compiles data from a variety of sources and works 
in close coordination with whole community partners. FEMA’s approach to developing 
the report includes the following activities: 
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• Reviewing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments 
(THIRA) and 2013 State Preparedness Report (SPR) submissions from 
states and territories 
• Conducting outreach to preparedness-related professional organizations 
and associations 
• Conducting research to update key findings from previous National 
Preparedness Reports and to identify new qualitative and quantitative 
preparedness data across all 31 core capabilities identified in the Goal 
• Evaluating results from established preparedness programs, including 
exercises and grants 
• Soliciting federal departments and agencies for information on notable 
accomplishments and challenges in enhancing preparedness 
• Soliciting updates from federal partners on their operational capability to 
meet the Goal and their progress in implementing the National Incident 
Management System 
• Partnering with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office 
of Infrastructure Protection to collect inputs from federal partners on 
activities undertaken to strengthen infrastructure security and resilience.228 
These data collection sources involve a broad range of stakeholders but there is no 
specificity on the response rate as a result of the solicitation efforts and outreach or on the 
quality of the information received. The stated intent of the National Preparedness 
Report “is to provide the nation with practical insights on core capabilities that can 
inform decisions about program priorities, resource allocation, and community 
actions.”229 The 2014 NPR provides seven key findings as a result of the data collection 
and analysis process: 
• New Approach to Recovery: Major events, such as Hurricane Sandy and 
the severe 2012–2013 drought, have served as catalysts for change in 
national preparedness, drawing clearer links between post-disaster 
recovery and pre-disaster mitigation activities.  
• National Areas for Sustainment: Continued progress has resulted in 
several mature capabilities across multiple mission areas that require 
ongoing sustainment to meet expected future needs.  
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• National Areas for Improvement: Cyber security, Infrastructure Systems, 
Health and Social Services, and Housing remained national areas for 
improvement. Long-term Vulnerability Reduction is a newly identified 
national area for improvement.  
• Emergency Policy and Planning Initiatives: New national policy and 
planning initiatives are focusing efforts to address areas for improvement 
in preparedness and national risk priorities.  
• Impact of Budget Uncertainties: Budget uncertainties have created 
challenges for preparedness initiatives, resulting in increased emphasis on 
preparedness innovations and whole community engagement.  
• Self-assessment Results from States and Territories: States and territories 
assessed their capabilities similar to levels reported in 2012, with the 
highest self-assessment scores in the common core capabilities and the 
Response mission area. States and territories also reported the most annual 
progress in Operational Coordination, Planning, and Intelligence and 
Information Sharing.  
• Integrating Tribal Partners: The Nation is integrating tribal partners more 
systematically into preparedness. However, challenges remain for federal 
agencies and tribal nations to increase engagement and expand training 
opportunities on relevant policies.230 
These key findings are strategic in nature, but it is questionable how much reliable 
data is available to analyze and compare. This makes it difficult to provide reasonable 
judgments and decision-quality recommendations. For instance, in the 2014 National 
Preparedness Report the states and territories reported capability levels similar to the 
2013 assessment, while at the same time reporting that declines in state budgets and high 
turnover rates among staff “contributed to gaps in 28 of the 31 core capabilities.”231 
There is either reason to question the results of the individual reports, or capabilities are 
somehow being sustained nationwide with fewer available resources.  
Measurement subjectivity is also evident in the 2012 and 2013 NPRs. In 2012, the 
average preparedness percentage across all core capabilities was 62 percent.232 In 2013, 
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the percentage fell to just 43 percent.233 It is unreasonable to think that an investment in 
excess of a billion dollars into the national preparedness system resulted in a nearly 20 
percent drop in capability.234 In this case, subjectivity seems to have rendered these 
reports meaningless. The 2014 and 2015 National Preparedness Reports state an average 
of 40.4235 and 42.5236 respectively showing some stability in the data but no trend of an 
increased capability is evident. 
Another discrepancy occurs when the states’ self-reported ratings are compared 
with independent assessments of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program 
(EMAP). According to the March 30, 2013 NPR, planning was one of the 10 highest 
rated capabilities among the states.237 55 percent of the States and Territories ranked 
themselves 4 or 5 on the Planning capability within the NPR.238 This self-rated capability 
remained stable at 52 percent in the 2014 NPR.239 However, the top three non-compliant 
standards in both the 2012 and 2013 EMAP annual analysis reports were contained 
within the operational planning section of the Emergency Management Standard. 
Programs undertaking an EMAP assessment were found to struggle to document 
compliance with common planning elements for continuity of operations and continuity 
of government.240 
Prior to the release of the first NPR, FEMA officials said that “their evaluation 
efforts were useful for their respective purposes, but the national preparedness 
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capabilities data that have been collected to date through selected evaluation efforts were 
limited by data reliability and measurement issues related to the lack of standardization in 
data collection.”241 It is unclear if data quality has improved since 2011 to substantially 
change the overall evaluation effort. “Despite the important role of individuals and 
communities in preparing for a disaster, FEMA faces numerous challenges in measuring 
the effectiveness of its efforts to enhance individual and community preparedness.”242 
The second key component of FEMA’s current assessment methodology is the 
THIRA. As part of the process, state and local governments are to develop individual 
capability requirements. The collective state THIRA reports are intended to provide 
FEMA with sufficient data to analyze and set national funding priorities.243 Completion 
of the THIRA is a requirement for all state and local governments receiving homeland 
security funding.244  
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IV. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The development of the model for performance management in assessing national 
preparedness is guided by the historical limitations and system requirements as 
established by federal law. This chapter begins by reviewing and analyzing the historical 
challenges and limitations of performance management system development. It then 
explores several concepts that would mitigate these challenges and facilitate a process to 
meet the GPRAMA’s intent. 
A. HISTORICAL CHALLENGES AND GAPS IN PERFORMANCE 
ASSESSMENT 
1. Enterprise Complexity 
As the fourth largest federal agency (following the Departments of Veterans 
Affairs, Army, and Navy) and the sixth largest department for federal discretionary 
budget authorization, DHS’s 240,000 personnel and 16 distinct congressionally funded 
organizational components perform a daunting array of missions.245 Each functional area 
maintains its own level of complexity and unique challenges with evolving threats and 
hazards, resource constraints, and high expectations.   
In addition to the challenges of the Department’s sheer size and scope of mission, 
DHS is still immature; it continues to evolve as new or unforeseen consequences confront 
our understanding of how to best protect, mitigate, respond to, recover from, and prepare 
for future events. Some of the most dramatic organizational changes in DHS occurred in 
2006, due to post-Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita legislative action. Significant 
changes also occurred (primarily in policy and programmatic areas) in 2013 following 
Super Storm Sandy. Coordinating and implementing these transformational changes 
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consumes significant time and resources on top of the daily activities needed to meet 
strategic goals and objectives.   
Three factors that intensify the complexity of DHS’s mission are: 
1. The threats are poorly understood. From homegrown, violent extremism to 
nuclear or cyber terrorism and climate change, the variety and ambiguity 
of threats to consider requires rigorous analysis and prioritization. 
2. The consequences of these threats and the means to mitigate or prevent 
them affect the nation in many ways. How can our communities, critical 
infrastructure, and modes of communication be protected without 
affecting the quality of the system, and what are the factors that set 
priorities? 
3. Solutions require multiple capabilities and, thus, integrated coordination 
and planning among multiple DHS component agencies and stakeholders. 
DHS must decide how to allocate resources across the homeland security 
enterprise, or whole community, to most effectively solve problems of 
national concern.246 
The concept of a “whole community” approach emerged as a key factor in 
national preparedness in 2008, when PPD-8 was signed into law. PPD-8 directed an 
“integrated, all-of-Nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness.”247 The National 
Preparedness Goal defined whole community as “a focus on enabling the participation in 
national preparedness activities of a wider range of players from the private and nonprofit 
sectors, including nongovernmental organizations and the general public, in conjunction 
with the participation of federal, state, and local governmental partners in order to foster 
better coordination and working relationships.”248 The term is sometimes used 
interchangeably with “all-of-nation.” See Figure 2 for a visual representation of the term. 
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Figure 2.  Whole of Community 
More recent DHS strategic documents include whole community as a core 
concept. The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) included the term as an 
“area of priority” for development, and it is mentioned 13 times throughout the report. 
Likewise, the latest DHS Strategic Plan mentions whole community six times. Three core 
principles are used to define the whole community approach: (1) “understanding and 
meeting the actual needs of the whole community; (2) engaging and empowering all parts 
of the community; and (3) strengthening what works well in communities on a daily 
basis.”249 The whole community includes the following subgroups: 
• Individuals and families, including those with access and functional needs  
• Businesses 
• Faith-based and community organizations 
• Nonprofit groups  
• Schools and academia 
• Media outlets 
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• All levels of government, including federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial partners250 
DHS relies heavily on the states and territories for whole community engagement; 
the NPR describes the output from the integrated self-assessment process to be based on  
“multi-disciplinary, statewide efforts to evaluate risk and assess preparedness, engaging 
representatives from law enforcement; fire service agencies; public health and medical 
systems, including emergency medical services, hospitals, and healthcare organizations; 
and non-governmental organizations.”251 
A GAO study found that coordination among regional jurisdictions proved 
difficult due to competing priorities and general autonomy.252 Overcoming these 
challenges will require homeland security managers to take states’ and municipalities’ 
many different operational structures and civic traditions into account.253 This is an 
enormous challenge that requires strong leadership, understanding, and commitment at 
every level. Leadership is perhaps the greatest influence on the process of performance 
management, and therefore its success. With a population as large and diverse as the 
whole community, unity of effort will be difficult to achieve. It is essential for leadership 
to prioritize performance management if the whole community is to yield reliable 
results.254 The key to incremental progress in this area will be a focused and cohesive 
effort that can begin breaking down the national preparedness enterprise’s complexities 
into manageable and prioritized segments. Then, the process of identifying and collecting 
meaningful data can begin. 
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There are several means currently available for conducting assessments on SLTT 
preparedness programs. These assessments often have different goals and outcomes and 
are referred to under different names (such as audits, technical assistance visits, 
monitoring visits, or evaluations). Some are mandated under federal law, such as the 
required grant audits, and others are imposed by the federal department or program 
manager. Others, still, are voluntary, such EMAP. While technological tools and systems 
offer a virtual means to provide limited monitoring of programs and project performance, 
most assessments include a face-to-face component or site visit. These visits are referred 
to as external assessments. The other means of assessing performance is through an 
internal process, or self-assessment. 
The NPR is required annually by PPD-8 and summarizes the progress made in 
achieving the targets established in the 31 core capabilities. Some of the report’s most 
critical inputs include information from the states and territories, described as “an 
integrated self-assessment process.” The NPR inputs come from the THIRA, SPR 
submissions, and grant reporting updates. All of this input is completed by the individual 
jurisdictions on a self-assessment and reporting basis.255  
The self-assessment process is one of the fundamental causes of a system that 
provides inconsistent, inaccurate, and unreliable data. And the resulting measurement 
subjectivity is one of the critical limitations of the current reporting system. For example, 
“because states develop their own capability requirements and use individual judgment 
rather than a quantitative standard to assess preparedness capabilities, it is difficult to 
identify differences and compare capability levels across states.”256 The policy of 
allowing individual data collection decisions creates non-standard data, variation among 
states in reporting structures, and subjective interpretation of the collected data. These 
limitations will ultimately prevent DHS from comparing metrics across all levels of 
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government.257 In addition to the general reporting variations, there may also be undue 
influence, either intentionally or subconsciously, on how the data is presented. These 
influences are caused by the consequences or rewards of a department admitting 
mistakes, programmatic shortfalls, or areas of non-compliance.258 One of the most 
important criteria for preparedness metrics is that they should avoid subjective 
assessments (particularly self-assessments) when possible.259 
While much of the blame for unreliable and invalid data stems from the self-
assessment process, it also has known benefits when incorporated into the overall 
performance management system. For example, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) views the 
self-assessment as a foundational element of their overall inspection system, calling it 
instrumental in “promoting responsibility and accountability within the unit.”260 One 
benefit of the self-assessment process is that it develops a culture that self-identifies 
deficiencies and fosters continuous improvement. Additionally, it develops trust among 
all of the stakeholders and a resulting reduced reliance on external assessments.261 
The key to effectively using self-assessment in the performance management 
system is to complement it with an independent and external validation of the internal 
process. The USAF has one such rigorous external inspection program to follow 
individual self-assessments. Two other programs that utilize the combination of internal 
and external assessments are the Baldrige Performance Excellence Program and the 
Emergency Management Accreditation Program. Each of these programs are discussed 
further in section D of this chapter. 
3. Expertise 
One challenge some historical assessment systems faced was a lack of resources 
to properly manage system inputs, or process that was too time consuming. At the root of 
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these two symptoms is a dearth of dedicated staff that possesses the knowledge, skills, 
and expertise to effectively work within the performance management system. Unless 
there are staff members dedicated to the performance improvement process, measuring 
preparedness can require trade-offs between the time staff members spend on 
assessments and the time allocated to other demands.262 States generally do not have 
readily available staff who maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities to run a 
performance management system, nor do they have the resources to support a dedicated 
assessment position.263 A recent RAND study on the quality of self-inspection programs 
revealed staff may be well qualified to perform their primary duty assignments but 
unqualified to serve in a performance management role; this is a potential root cause for 
unreliable reporting.264 FEMA officials, however, stated that “the cost of using federal 
employees or contractors to collect and validate preparedness data at the state and local 
levels would be prohibitive.”265 
The Department of Defense (DOD) addressed the staffing challenges by levying a 
requirement on all services to train and certify at least five percent of an organization’s 
staff as Lean Six Sigma Green Belts (the lowest level of staff certification), and one 
percent as Lean Six Sigma Black Belts (the highest level of staff certification).266 The 
distinction of “onboard population” is significant in that no additional positions were 
authorized for the new performance management requirement. The intended goal was to 
add a performance management skill set to every unit and drive improvement from 
within. It is not clear if the services were able to attain this goal, although USAF 
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personnel recommended that, in order to be fully effective, performance management 
staff must be added to the resource requirement list and accordingly funded.267 
4. Value of Effort 
Value of effort can also be viewed in terms of return on investment. In the context 
of time and resources used to design, collect, and analyze performance data, the actual 
value may be difficult to assess. In terms of the allocation of federal grant dollars, 
however, the value may only be evident (at least from the grantee’s perspective) in terms 
of the rewards. For example, consider the three criteria in determining funding 
authorizations for states and territories (legislative minimum amounts, anticipated 
effectiveness, and risk methodology). For the 25 states that receive only the minimum 
amount—which essentially eliminates the risk and effectiveness portions of the 
equation—would the allocation decision change if one of those states put the time, effort 
and resources into a compelling effectiveness context?268 Full transparency of the 
decision process is extremely important to ensure the proper organizational behavior is 
reinforced and encouraged. In addition, standardization among all the grant recipients 
will be necessary to level the playing field and prevent the jurisdictions with more 
available resources to always “one-up” those with less. 
One example of positive results yielded from investment in a performance 
management system occurred within the Federal Aviation Administration. The 
Administration’s voluntary reporting programs were implemented without a significant 
budget increase due to program performance improvements that, over time, offset the 
imposed costs. Although no formal quantitative analysis of the voluntary reporting 
program’s effectiveness was available, there was unanimous agreement that the voluntary 
reporting programs had been “well worth the effort,” and that “the payback was very 
high.”269 This consensus was based on the outcomes of data reported, which included 
significant numbers of safety issues and resulted in corrective actions. There is also a 
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consensus that the oversight and quality assurance programs in place prior to the 
voluntary programs would not have identified most of the safety issues, which means 
proactive corrective actions would not have been possible.270 
5. Benchmarks and Standards 
A significant impediment to collecting consistent, reliable, and accurate 
preparedness measures is the lack of process standards. A typical approach to measuring 
performance is counting resources or activities—such as how many exercises are 
conducted annually, or how many level-4 protective suits are on hand. Although easy to 
conduct, this approach is risky because it does not focus on the actual quality or 
effectiveness of the capability that will have greater impact on the outcome of a response 
operation. For example, two jurisdictions may each have a current preparedness, 
mitigation, or other relevant plan, but one jurisdiction effectively collaborated with 
relevant stakeholders and completed a plan that is a useful reference in the conduct of 
operations. In contrast, the other jurisdiction produced a plan merely to satisfy the federal 
grant requirement and is not considered a useful reference for training, exercises or 
operations. Two common mistakes leaders make are either to capture strategy session 
decisions in a glossy pamphlet that is never used, or to not capture the ideas, assuming 
the participants will take the appropriate action on their own.271 Another example is the 
significant difference between counting bodies available to respond to specific events and 
ensuring the staff members are properly trained, with recent experience to keep their 
skills sharp. A standardized approach to these activities will help ensure agency processes 
and data collection efforts are reliable. 
Benchmarking is described as “the process of identifying, learning, adapting to, 
and measuring outstanding practices and processes from any organization to improve 
performance.”272 In short, it is a tool used to seek out and identify standards. The 
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resulting standards could be considered either a baseline of performance, due to 
regulations or other guidance, or the gold standard for the industry, which highlights 
ultimate goals for performance. A benchmark, then, is “a standard or point of reference 
used to measure or judge quality or value.”273 The focus of the benchmarking process 
should be on supporting the organization’s strategic objectives and providing challenging 
but attainable goals.274 Benchmarking can be conducted on internal elements of the 
organization across the homeland security enterprise or other government agencies, 
among private sector entities, or within academia or national foundations. Ultimately, 
finding the best benchmark may require a review of several candidates with similar 
processes, and could evolve and change over time.275 
Benchmarks should be managed by DHS to establish priorities and ensure 
standardization across the enterprise. Several opportunities exist to collect and establish 
common standards. Perhaps the most comprehensive established standard on the specific 
activities of the homeland security mission reside within the Emergency Management 
Standard. 
The Emergency Management Standard was established in compliance with the 
American National Standards Institute requirements and policies. The program is 
“intended to indicate the essential components of a quality emergency management 
program. State and local emergency managers created the standards; they describe what a 
program should accomplish, but not necessarily how compliance should be achieved. 
This provides flexibility to accommodate the variety of sizes and complexity found in 
state and local emergency management programs in the United States. Full compliance 
with all the standards is required for full accreditation.”276 Currently, jurisdictions 
volunteer to enter the accreditation process and fund the external team that conducts the 
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assessment. The Emergency Management Standard consists of 64 standards within 16 
broader categories:  
• Program Management 
• Administration and Finance 
• Laws and Authorities 
• Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Consequence Analysis 
• Hazard Mitigation 
• Prevention 
• Operational Planning 
• Incident Management 
• Resource Management and Logistics 
• Mutual Aid 
• Communications and Warning 
• Operations and Procedures 
• Facilities 
• Training 
• Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Action 
• Crisis Communications, Public Education, and Information277 
Another avenue to identify viable benchmarks and establish enterprise standards 
is the audit, inspection, and program monitoring functions that currently exist in DHS. 
The DHS OIG has a unique opportunity to view and analyze a substantial sample 
population every year, and the entire enterprise over a multiple-year period. The ability to 
conduct thorough programmatic reviews of a variety of organizations conducting 
identical missions with similar processes allows the OIG to assess and identify the best 
performers across the SLTT community and highlight those techniques and procedures 
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that could benefit others. The USAF conducts a similar program with their OIG, in which 
they disseminate information, innovative ideas, and lessons learned as a result of 
inspections and changes to inspection policy.278 
Other potential areas to review and identify standards within the homeland 
security enterprise include: 
• The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
(http://www.nist.gov/). The NIST standards are often technical in nature, 
and there are many areas of research within NIST that directly support the 
homeland security mission. 
• The Baldrige Program (http://www.nist.gov/baldrige/). Within NIST, the 
Baldrige Program is “a public-private partnership that is committed to 
improving competitiveness and performance of U.S. organizations”279 
through education and assessment tools and criteria.   
• The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
(http://www.iso.org/): The ISO has over 19,000 standards publications 
involving technical specifications, product standards, process standards, 
and regulatory requirements for products and associated processes.280  
International organizations performing the same mission are also ideal templates 
for identifying standards. Countries with similar strategic missions and advanced 
homeland security functions include Great Britain, Israel, and Australia, among others. 
6. Standardized Data 
The Goal asserts that “all levels of government and the whole community should 
present and assess risk in a similar manner in order to provide a common understanding 
of the threats and hazards confronting our nation.”281 One of the key challenges in using 
state and local data to provide a national preparedness assessment is the jurisdictions’ 
differences in terms of capabilities, culture, threats and hazards, and population densities, 
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to name a few. Given their uniqueness, is there a way to assess the individual states and 
jurisdictions while maintaining the capability to combine the data into a cohesive and 
accurate national picture of readiness? “While we have a natural predilection for a picture 
of national preparedness derived from a commonly applied set of rules, we must come to 
terms with the dissonances found in each state. This will require a mastery of 
fundamental principles, an awareness of cognitive pitfalls, flexibility in how we structure 
our objectives, a willingness to assimilate and adapt, and a mechanism by which we can 
accelerate the pace of development.”282  
Data can be difficult to collect and is problematic to correlate when there are 
differing reporting standards. One potential source of standardized and reliable data can 
come from DHS OIG reports. These audits are used to ensure that states comply with 
applicable laws and regulations in the execution of their grant award. The reports can be 
considered a reliable source for data because the OIG uses “generally accepted 
government auditing standards” (GAGAS) that provide a consistent and high-quality 
framework for conducting audits.283   
In addition to the financial and legal aspects of grant management, the OIG also 
reviews some management, programmatic, and administrative aspects of homeland 
security. Recent findings show “challenges related to the states’ homeland security 
strategies, obligation of grants, reimbursement to subgrantees for expenditures, 
monitoring of subgrantees’ performance and financial management, procurement, and 
property management.”284 These findings have potential to provide valuable 
contributions to performance measurements.  
OIG reports show states did not always obligate Homeland Security Grant 
Program (HSGP) grants to subgrantees in a timely manner. This practice has the potential 
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to increase administrative costs and hinder the subgrantees’ ability to accomplish their 
designated capability development activities or complete projects. Additionally, many 
states did not provide adequate oversight of subgrantee performance in execution of their 
allocated grant funds. This shortfall limits the understanding of the lower jurisdiction’s 
progress in developing or achieving essential capabilities. In addition, states often did not 
ensure an alignment of requested funds to identified threats and vulnerabilities potentially 
resulting in poor management of scarce resources. Weaknesses in property management 
were also found to negatively affect the state’s ability to make informed decisions on 
eliminating capability gaps.285 
As an illustration, the chart in Figure 3 shows the audit results for state and 
territorial jurisdictions during FY 2014. In all, there were 14 total audits with only one 
jurisdiction reporting zero recommendations for corrective actions.286 The data, if only at 
a high level, clearly shows several areas for concern and some potential focus areas for 
the entire enterprise.  
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Figure 3.  DHS OIG Homeland Security Grant Award Results287 
In addition to identifying capability gaps and effectively building toward closing 
those gaps, the DHS OIG has also identified programmatic shortfalls with state 
preparedness programs. One common deficiency involves the process of developing state 
homeland security strategies. The OIG found many state strategies lack specific goals and 
objectives and many others were outdated. Other states did not have an updated strategy 
that reflected current priorities and threats which can negatively impact budget 
decisions.288 
In their latest annual analysis report, the EMAP organization outlined three areas 
in which state, local, and now private entities have the greatest challenges for non-
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compliance. All three areas fall within the planning standards section of the Emergency 
Management Standard. The specific areas are plans for continuity of government (COG), 
continuity of operations (COOP), and emergency response/operations, communications, 
and recovery.289  
Comparing the results of the DHS OIG and EMAP assessments highlights the 
organizations’ different approaches. The OIG’s focus tends to follow accounting 
principles and standards while looking at organizational strategic plans and general 
performance. The EMAP assessment is more focused on the various programmatic 
mission requirements. Both perspectives are important for analyzing performance, and a 
combined approach would provide a more comprehensive assessment.  
There are also challenges to identify and collect proper metrics. Measurements 
must be tied to processes or outcomes of identified goals and objectives through 
organizational strategic plans. However, not all of the identified metrics will be owned or 
generated by the organization desiring the data, and other organizations or departments 
may not always be willing to provide the needed data. Another trial is finding a 
measurement that will provide the appropriate feedback within the required period of 
time. Taking annual measurements will not allow for timely policy or process corrections 
and would hamper management effectiveness. Measurements that fluctuate on a daily or 
weekly timeframe, on the other hand, are perhaps too specific to provide meaningful and 
actionable data. 
The DOD established guidance for implementing their performance management 
system to ensure “a common set of standards for training, certification, deployment, and 
operational approaches that apply a common body of knowledge for implementation and 
execution of CPI/LSS (continuous process improvement/lean six sigma are two 
disciplines for performance management systems) across DOD organizations.”290 
                                                 
289 Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Assessment Analysis Report, January – 
December 2013 (Lexington, KY: Emergency Management Accreditation Program, 2014), 6, 
http://www.emaponline.org/index.php/root/assessor-resources/47-2013-assessment-analysis-report-1, 
Accessed November 8, 2014. 
290 Department of Defense Instruction 5010.43, Implementation and Management of the DOD-Wide 
Continuous Process Improvement/Lean Six Sigma (CPI/LSS) Program, July 17, 2009, 6.c. 
 83 
B. ALIGNMENT 
The current federal performance reporting mechanism for all SLTT jurisdictions 
consists of three main products: the SPR (required annually with stakeholder input from 
jurisdictions within the state), the THIRA (also required annually and with stakeholder 
input), and reports required by individual grant programs exceeding $100,000 per project 
or grant period—this report is submitted on a government-wide form called the 
Performance Progress Report (SF-PPR). 
The foundation of the performance management system resides in the DHS’s core 
strategic documents: the Strategic Plan, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Annual 
Performance Report, and National Preparedness Report. This foundation is represented 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Foundation of DHS Strategic Planning291 
                                                 
291 Data derived from Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security 
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It is essential for PPD-8 and all of its directed guidance documents to align in 
order to properly measure and evaluate performance. An enterprise’s key elements (its 
people, processes, customers, strategy, and leadership) must have synergy or unity of 
effort to realize established strategic goals and objectives. To be successful, alignment 
occurs in two key dimensions: vertically and horizontally. The chart in Figure 5 depicts 





Figure 5.  Vertical and Horizontal Strategic Alignment292 
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Vertical alignment ensures all members of the enterprise are linked to the strategy 
and drives an opportunity for involvement at all levels; horizontal alignment links the 
customer to the business processes and ensures the outcome meets the recipients’ 
expectation.293 In terms of national preparedness, strategic policy and guidance mandates 
that the customer is integrally involved in not only providing input to the process, but 
also as a resource provider. PPD-8 directs the whole community as an integral part of the 
process “to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest 
risk to the security of the Nation.”294   
One way to align the goals and objectives to DHS is to complete a matrix similar 
to the one shown in Figure 6. Using this type of approach will illuminate how the many 
SLTT programs fit into the national strategic objectives. Completing this type of activity 
should also include the many local and state stakeholders (whole community) who play a 
role in the various homeland security and emergency management aspects. This activity 
should also assist the SLTT community in the grant application and justification process. 
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Figure 6.  Strategic Alignment295 
 
                                                 
295 Data derived from Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Years 2012–2016 Strategic Plan, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf. 
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“Strategy alignment ensures strategic goals and priorities cascade across the 
enterprise with supporting implementation and initiative priorities.”296 An important 
aspect of strategy alignment is performance management methods that make visible 
performance gaps and problem resolution. In addition transparently identified gaps, a key 
component of alignment is accountability and the associated dialogue.297   
DHS provides strategic guidance to SLTT jurisdictions through grant funding 
opportunity announcements (FOA). The guidance provides funding priorities but has a 
generally non-directive approach, using language such as “grantees are expected to” and 
“grantees should.”298 It is unclear what actions DHS would take against grantees that did 
not follow the FOA’s intent. For FY 2014, the priorities were determined from the 2013 
NPR, and included “cyber security, recovery of core capabilities, integration of 
individuals with functional and access needs, enhanced resilience of infrastructure 
systems, and matured public-private partnerships.”299 Since the NPR is still developing 
(it is only on its third annual iteration), using the report for determining funding priorities 
is new for FY 2014. To complement the selected annual grant priorities, 25 percent of the 
total HSGP funding allocation is required to be directed toward law enforcement 
terrorism prevention activities. In addition, since 80 percent of the HSGP authorization to 
each state must be passed to local units of government, there is a built-in whole 
community aspect to this grant program.  
Analyzing the DHS funding priorities from FY 2008 through FY 2014 leads to 
two distinct observations. First, while the priorities are left purposefully vague for SLTT 
flexibility, the years from 2008 through 2013 revealed little specificity in goals and 
objectives. In addition, there seemed to be little continuity through the years, or reasoning 
for priorities. Second, the 2014 funding priorities based on the NPR are trending toward 
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slightly better fidelity and specificity. This fidelity will continue to improve in 
conjunction with reporting system development, but standardization and unreliable state 
self-reporting will continue to be an issue until the process is enhanced. Funding 
priorities for FY 2008 through 2014 are outlined in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Homeland Security Grant Program Funding Priorities FY 08-14300 
PPD-8 directed an “integrated, all-of-nation, capabilities-based approach to 
national preparedness.”301 The latest HSGP funding guidance calls for programs that are 
based on risk-driven, capabilities-based strategic plans that address both the sustainment 
of current capabilities and the mitigation of capability gaps. The guidance further states 
that “grantees are to prioritize their funding in order to address gaps in achieving 
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capability targets set through the annual THIRA, and identified through the annual 
SPR.”302  
All states and territories are provided funding authorization according to three 
criteria: legislative minimum amounts, anticipated program effectiveness, and DHS’s risk 
methodology. In addition, they are expected to consider funding priorities identified in 
the previous year’s NPR.303 
This guidance shapes the questions that determine funding allocation. For the 
SHSP, the baseline funding formula for 2014 was 0.35 percent of the total allocation to 
52 states and territories, and 0.08 percent to the remaining four territories comprising 
approximately 19 percent of the total budget.304 The DHS determines relative risk to a 
jurisdiction by analyzing the area’s population, critical infrastructure, and economic 
security. Finally, the effectiveness component is based on how project description in the 
investment jurisdiction section of the grant application aligns with the gaps identified in 
the state THIRA and SPR. Of the 56 eligible SHSP grantees, 25 receive funding solely on 
the baseline funding formula.305 It is not clear or readily transparent how the 
effectiveness and the DHS risk assessment criteria affect or influence funding 
determinations. 
Given the lack of available preparedness performance criteria, it is unlikely that 
this component holds significant weight within the analysis. If, however, reliable and 
meaningful effectiveness data were available, this component could become a key 
indicator of the funding allocation equation. Performance data could help answer the 
question: How successful were the grant applicants in meeting their stated goals and 
objectives during prior funding years?  
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An organization’s ability to establish performance criteria and show significant 
progress toward identified targets is an indicator of effectiveness. A related question to 
determine program effectiveness is: How did the grant programs meet state or national 
priorities as identified in their respective strategic plans? Due to the reduction in grant 
funding over the past six years, there are limited funds available to state homeland 
security programs and not all priorities can be confronted. It is therefore essential that 
those limited resources are used to address the strategic priorities. Finally, the question of 
how jurisdictions are able to sustain and validate capabilities through training, exercises, 
and equipment maintenance and replacement can be addressed.  
Goals, objectives, and priorities can be aligned through a detailed planning 
process. A simple table identifying DHS’s strategy and the SLTT jurisdiction’s correlated 
goals, objectives, and performance metrics is useful to show aligned missions and 
programs. A conceptual idea of this output is displayed in Figure 8. This process will 
facilitate management decisions by ensuring that management understands process 
efficiencies and effectiveness, informs jurisdictional appropriators, and, with additional 
process development and analysis, provides data to inform Congress of preparedness 
grant programs’ effectiveness.  
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Figure 8.  Alignment of Goals, Objectives, and Metrics 
C. PROCESS ANALYSIS 
Evaluating performance is more than just outputs, outcomes, or a list of 
capabilities. In reviewing an organization’s ability to perform its mission, there are many 
other factors that directly impact effectiveness, such as internal decision-making 
processes, leadership qualities, and external social networks.306 For this reason, looking 
at the entire process for efficiencies and quality production will affect the organization’s 
capacity to conduct operations and improve the overall results. This is known as process 
analysis. 
Process analysis involves a detailed review of the horizontal alignment and is 
commonly known as the “SIPOC,” or suppliers, inputs, process, output, and customer. 
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These elements describe the flow of goods and services through an organization that 
eventually lead to outcomes and recognized success levels. For this analysis, the SIPOC 
model is reversed; it begins with perhaps the most critical element in the chain: the 
customer. The reverse flow follows the COPIS model as illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  High Level Process Map 
Like the vertical and horizontal alignment model, the COPIS model offers 
opportunities to identify and collect key metrics and performance measures throughout 
the entire chain of events. The primary identification sources for these performance 
indicators are typically found within the core processes. One of performance 
measurement’s main challenges is collecting data that supports the identified metrics. In 
some cases, the effort to collect data or measure activities will exceed the department’s 
resources. If the measure is critical to assessing performance, there may be opportunities 
to identify other measures that are easier to collect and, together, provide performance 
measurement indication. Additionally, the organization may not always own the critical 
data, and may need to enter into agreements with external entities to access the 
information. In other cases, data requirements within the department will be available but 
not currently collected. 
While many of the key processes will align with the mission areas identified in 
DHS’s Strategic Plan, there will also be unique processes and mission areas within each 
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unique jurisdiction, statutory requirements, and risks. Likewise, there will be DHS 
mission areas that will not directly apply to all SLTTs. 
1. Customer 
For the purposes of this research and the challenge of assessing and reporting on 
national preparedness, the customer is focused primarily on congressional appropriators 
and congressional committees that oversee DHS. For the purpose of a process analysis, 
the customer can include anyone within the definition of whole community, as all would 
benefit (receive goods and services) from the enterprise. The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) defines a customer indicator as a type of measure that informs the 
improvement of government’s interaction with those it serves or regulates.307 
The customer is generally considered the area of primary significance in 
collecting satisfaction measures. The main challenge in measuring customer satisfaction 
is often that the result is based on perception. Since the customer is at the end of the 
goods-or-services delivery process, rates of satisfaction can be considered a reflection of 
the entire process. In essence, the gap between what the organization claims are its 
customer-oriented goals and the customer’s perception its true goal achievement form the 
basis for a measure of organizational effectiveness.308 
2. Inputs 
Inputs are the resources required to produce a good or service. OMB defines an 
input indicator as a measure that indicates the consumption of expended resources, 
especially time and/or money.309 While preparedness is “often associated with 
capabilities and training, key inputs can also include people, equipment, supplies, and 
maintenance.”310 According to the Government Auditing Standards, “inputs are the 
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amount of resources (in terms of money, material, personnel, etc.) that are put into a 
program. These resources may come from inside or outside the entity operating the 
program. Input measures can have a number of dimensions, such as cost, timing, and 
quality. Examples of input measures are: dollars spent, employee-hours expended, and 
square feet of building space.”311 
For the DOD, the current balance of inputs was developed over decades of 
experience; these inputs have produced an outcome that is deemed positive, as confirmed 
in recent military operations. The challenge for the DOD, and DHS, is to produce the 
desired outcomes while ensuring inputs are optimally structured and efficient, and do not 
waste precious resources. Additionally, in a dynamic environment such as war or 
disaster, what has traditionally worked in the past may not always work for future 
events.312 
3. Process 
Process is generally concerned with the internal transactions required to produce 
an output. There are many measures within the process that can provide indications of 
efficiency. OMB defines an efficiency indicator as a type of measure, specifically “a ratio 
of a program activity inputs (such as costs or hours worked by employees) to its outputs 
or outcomes.”313 Efficiency indicators reflect the resources used to achieve outcomes or 
produce outputs. Process measures can be as simple as the cost to produce a single unit of 
output. In other circumstances, it is more useful to find effective practices and then look 
for lower-cost delivery options.314 These metrics provide program managers and process 
owners insight on where bottlenecks or delays in process flow occur. The diagram in 
Figure 10 shows an example of a simple notional process that would track the cost of 
human resources and show areas for potential improvement in wasted or idle time. These 
metrics are types of process indicators, which they OMB define as types of measure that 
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indicate how well a procedure, process or operation is working, (e.g., timeliness, 
accuracy, or completeness).315 







Figure 10.  Simple Process Flow Diagram 
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Process flow diagrams can represent simple or complex business interactions. 
Using Michael Hammer’s three main process categories of governing, core, and enabling, 
we can begin to identify the key elements contributing to DHS’s mission. The chart in 
Figure 11 shows a graphic representation of the key elements in each process category. 
Each category and its elements function together to realize the desired goal, objective, or 
outcome. It is therefore essential to identify the elements within each of the categories 
and analyze their respective processes and interrelationships. 
 
Figure 11.  Three Primary Process Categories316 
4. Outputs 
Outputs are generally the products or services the customer is demanding. In the 
manufacturing sector, outputs can be measured by simply counting the number of 
widgets produced. There can also be associated metrics, such as the time required to 
produce a widget, the number of defects discovered at the end of the production line, or 
the production resources’ efficiency. Outputs represent “the quantity of goods or services 
produced by a program. For example, an output measure for a job training program could 
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be the number of persons completing training, and an output measure for a safety 
program could be the number of safety inspections completed.”317 
OMB describes an output indicator as a type of measure, specifically “the 
tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort, usually expressed 
quantitatively.”318 They also distinguish that an output indicator should also have a 
“reasonable” connection to outcomes. Therefore, output indicators should be based on 
evidence supporting the relationship between outputs and outcomes.319 
In the mission areas of readiness or preparedness good output measures can be 
challenging to develop and collect. Consequently, inputs are often used in lieu of outputs 
because money spent or the numbers of widgets purchased are easy to document and 
track. In his report on assessing military readiness, Todd Harrison describes the 
challenges associated with using inputs over outputs as the primary measurement tool. 
In the DOD, readiness inputs are often used as proxy measures for the 
output—forces’ ability to perform their assigned missions. But an implicit 
assumption in this approach is that changes in the inputs will result in 
corresponding changes in the outputs. Moreover, it assumes that the input 
target levels set by the military are optimal to achieve the types and levels 
of readiness required by defense strategy.320 
These assumptions show the limits input measures alone can have on managers 
and leaders in using this type of data to make informed decisions and reliably track 
organizational performance. 
5. Outcomes 
Outcomes are a program’s accomplishments or results. Outcomes may be 
influenced by a variety of external factors to include cultural differences or a dramatic 
change in national or local economic conditions. “Outcome measures show the progress 
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made in achieving the stated program purpose. Outcomes also include unexpected and/or 
unintentional effects of a program, both positive and negative.321“ 
An intermediate outcome indicator is a type of measure that indicates progress 
against an intermediate outcome. The intermediate outcome then contributes to an 
ultimate outcome, such as the percentage of schools adopting effective literacy programs, 
compliance levels, or the rate of adoption of safety practices.322 Outcome indicators 
measure progress against the intended result of a program and changes in conditions the 
government is trying to influence.323 Examples of outcome measures can be: the 
retention rate of fully trained staff; the rate of change in safety violations or incidents; or 
the success rate of corrective actions on previously identified problems.  
D. ASSESSMENT AND REPORTING 
The benefits and challenges of self-assessment in the homeland security enterprise 
were discussed previously in this Chapter in section A. “Systematically using self-
reported data or expert judgment in assessments is difficult, but processes can be 
designed to minimize subjectivity or other skewing effects.”324 One common method to 
inculcate standardization and reliability into a self-assessment system is to add oversight. 
There are three examples of oversight that utilize an external form of assessment: the 
EMAP, the Baldrige Performance Excellence Program, and the USAF. 
EMAP uses a self-assessment process to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness 
of emergency management programs. To mitigate the challenges of self-assessing and 
reporting the EMAP provides an independent and on site review of all documentation and 
programs. The goal of accreditation “is to evaluate an emergency management program’s 
organization, resources, plans, and capabilities against current standards to increase 
effectiveness in protecting residents’ lives and property.”325 
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(Lexington, KY: Emergency Management Accreditation Program, 2011), 1. 
 101 
EMAP establishes the minimum acceptable performance criteria for an 
emergency management program and also establishes a means for strategic 
improvement.326 The self-assessment component is designed to identify and correct any 
deficiencies against the published standards. Then an external team is assigned to conduct 
an on-site assessment of all the standards and validate the program’s self-reporting. There 
are ten steps to attain EMAP accreditation: 
1. Request information 
2. Program assessment tool subscription 
3. Self-assessment and documentation 
4. Application for accreditation 
5. Preparation for on-site assessment 
6. On-site assessment and report 
7. Committee review and recommendation 
8. Commission consideration of committee recommendations 
9. Accreditation certificate presentation 
10. Accreditation process critique327 
Once accredited, the program is required to submit an annual update on efforts 
taken to remain EMAP compliant until the next external assessment, which is due after 
five years. This is similar to the USAF’s compliance assessment approach. 
The USAF uses an on-site inspection as the assessment system’s external 
component. The USAF inspection system’s purpose is threefold: “to enable and 
strengthen effectiveness and efficiency; to promote improved unit performance and 
management excellence up and down the chain of command; and to identify issues 
interfering with effectiveness, efficiency, compliance, readiness, performance, and 
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management excellence.”328 The assessment system provides senior leaders an 
independent, standardized review of all Air Force units and validates the unit’s self-
assessment processes.329 
One of the key benefits of the independent is that it brings in assessors who 
possess insight and experience from visiting many units that manage the same functions. 
Not only do they have the most up-to-date knowledge on guidance and policy, they are 
also able to analyze and evaluate how disparate organizations approach and resolve 
common challenges. The assessors serve as subject-matter experts, but also as collectors 
and distributors of established good practices and lessons learned.330 The objectivity and 
fresh perspective that outsiders bring to an organization are considered important benefits 
of any assessment system.331 
The USAF also conducts a “management inspection” as part of their overall 
assessment portfolio. This inspection consists of seven major categories: strategic 
planning, organizational management, customers, process operations, resources, data-
driven decisions, and organizational performance.332 These seven categories are similar 
in focus to the internationally accepted “Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence 
categories: leadership; strategic planning; customer focus; measurement, analysis, and 
knowledge management; workforce focus; operations focus; and results.”333 The table in 
Figure 12 compares the major categories within each assessment for the USAF and 
Baldrige assessment programs. 
                                                 
328 Secretary of Air Force (IG), Air Force Inspection System, 7–8. 
329 Ibid., 19. 
330 Camm et al., Charting the Course, 46. 
331 Ibid., 45. 
332 Secretary of Air Force (IG), Air Force Inspection System, 38–39. 
333 National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, Baldrige 
Performance Excellence Program, January 2013, ii. 
 103 
 
Figure 12.  Comparison of Air Force and Baldrige Criteria334 
The Baldrige Performance Excellence Program uses tools, assessment criteria, 
and standards to facilitate a robust self-assessment program. In addition to the national 
program, there are also regional, state, and local programs that can provide assistance to 
organizations. In order to receive an award for performance excellence at the local, state, 
or national levels, however, an on-site assessment by trained and credentialed assessors is 
required. The state benefits of applying for the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality 
Award are: 
• Accelerated improvement efforts: The application process itself 
accelerates and goes beyond internal self-assessments by bringing a 
rigorous, objective, external viewpoint to an organization’s internal 
improvement process. 
• Energized employees: Pursuing a common goal motivates employees, 
resulting in energized improvement efforts. 
• An outside perspective: Applying for the Baldrige Award is an 
opportunity to have a team of experts examine your organization 
objectively and identify strengths and opportunities to improve. Five to 
eight trained experts from an independent Board of Examiners spend a 
minimum of 300 hours reviewing each application, and site-visited 
applicants receive more than 1,000 hours of review. 
                                                 
334 Air Force Criteria are obtained from Secretary of Air Force (IG), Air Force Inspection System, Air 
Force Publication 90–201 (Washington, DC: Secretary of Air Force (IG), 2013). The Baldrige Criteria are 
obtained from “Criteria for Performance Excellence, 2013–2014” Baldrige Performance Excellence 
Program, http://www.nist.gov/baldrige/publications/archive/2013_2014_business_nonprofit_criteria.cfm. 
 104 
• Learning from the feedback: Each applicant receives an objective, non-
prescriptive, written feedback report of its strengths and opportunities for 
improvement based on an examination of its award application against the 
Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence. Organizations often use the 
report in their strategic planning to focus on their customers and improve 
results, as well as to help energize and guide improvement efforts. 
• Aligned efforts and resources: The linkages among the requirements of the 
seven Baldrige Criteria categories help your organization achieve better 
coordination and consistency among plans, processes, information, 
resource decisions, actions, results, analysis, and learning.335 
E. TRAINING 
In order to effectively work within a performance management system, all levels 
of the enterprise must have trained and knowledgeable staff to advise and assist in 
strategic and performance planning activities. The functions equivalent to a performance 
improvement officer (PIO) within the federal system requires highly specific skills and 
expertise. There are many private institutions that provide standardized and credentialed 
training and education to meet PIO requirements. In addition to the PIO, the SLTT 
community will also need to expand their knowledge, skills, and abilities to assess 
program effectiveness. 
Currently DHS, through the Emergency Management Institute, offers a three-day 
training course, designated the E0122 Emergency Management Accreditation Program. 
The training is designed to inform emergency management, preparedness, and homeland 
security personnel with information regarding the accreditation process and assessment 
system using the established standards.336 After passing the course exam, participants are 
eligible to serve as a jurisdiction’s or program’s accreditation manager, and can also 
become voluntary assessors for EMAP if they meet additional experience and knowledge 
requirements.337 The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium partners are also well 
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suited to expand their extensive training and education portfolio to include performance 
management or assessment education. 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires the DHS OIG, to audit individual 
states’ and territories’ management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban 
Areas Security Initiative grants. These audits’ objectives are to determine if grant 
recipients have distributed and spent grant funds effectively and efficiently, and if they 
have done so in compliance with laws and regulations, state homeland security strategies, 
and other applicable plans. In addition, the OIG assesses the extent to which funds 
awarded help meet the National Preparedness Goal objectives. For all deficient areas 
identified, the OIG provides recommendations designed to strengthen program 
management, performance, and oversight of the jurisdiction’s program.338 
The latest NPR highlighted a potential issue with divergent perceptions regarding 
roles and responsibilities in the homeland security enterprise. One of the questions 
involved a local perspective on federal versus state roles in addressing gaps in the 31 core 
capabilities. State responses across all the core capabilities ranged from 53 percent to 91 
percent in the categories of “entirely a state responsibility” or “mostly a state 
responsibility.”339 DHS’s comments regarding the results were: “These insights reflect 
state and territory observations from the State Preparedness Report and may differ from 
Federal perspectives on who bears more responsibility for addressing identified gaps. 
However, these observations promote dialogue among Federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial partners regarding expected roles and responsibilities.”340 This finding is 
critical to the entire preparedness goal. Without clearly understanding who owns the 
responsibility for closing capability gaps, how can the homeland security enterprise 
efficiently close those gaps without substantial duplication of effort? 
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The EMAP identifies the selection of an accreditation manager as a critical senior 
management decision. The accreditation manager ensures the data collection and results 
of all the organization’s activities, plans, and procedures meet the established standards. 
Compliance determination is made through detailed analysis and documentation. This 
position is best served by someone who can provide long-term continuity to the position 
for consistent and reliable results.341 
Metrics, Data, and Measurement 
The collection of measurements is a detailed and critical process. As with the 
threat intelligence cycle, the sole act of collecting data does not provide sufficient context 
for managers to make informed decisions. Data must be analyzed, compared, sorted or 
otherwise manipulated to create information. This new information is then synthesized 
with other information, or experience, to create knowledge. Over time, knowledge is 
assimilated into managerial and organizational wisdom, which is manifested in the 
leaders’ decisions.342 
Another way to impart context to data is to use a balanced approach. The 
recognized standard for balance in a measurement system is the Balanced Scorecard, 
which uses different viewpoints to analyze an organization’s outcome or output. The four 
main categories used by Kaplan and Norton to develop a balanced perspective on 
performance are customer, financial, internal business processes, and learning and 
growth.343 Applying different sets of data, from different perspectives but related to a 
specific process, helps provide additional context and facilitates analysis. This kind of 
data can also be described as contextual indicators, or data that provides situational 
information for the purpose of better understanding how trends are related to a goal or a 
program.344 
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The primary challenge to understanding national preparedness performance is the 
data availability and collection gap that is inherent within the “whole community.” 
Current laws mandate federal agencies comply with the collection and reporting 
requirements for performance management. These directives, however, do not apply to 
SLTT jurisdictions. DHS, however, through grant guidance, does require SLTT entities 
to provide investment justifications for expenditures during the application process, 
progress reports throughout the fiscal year, and the annual SPR and the THIRA reports. 
If the whole community is deemed an essential element of the homeland security 
enterprise and is critical to successfully meeting national goals and objectives, then there 
needs to be a focused and substantial effort applied toward identifying and collecting 
meaningful data that can help drive policy, initiatives, and resource allocation. “Whole 
community partners offer programs and initiatives that contribute to the core capabilities 
outlined in the Goal. However, in many cases, measures and metrics do not yet exist to 
gauge performance, either quantitatively or qualitatively, over time. PPD-8 envisions a 
National Preparedness System that includes a comprehensive approach to assessments 
using clear, objective, and quantifiable performance measures.”345 
Collecting good data is an arduous and intensive task. As a result, many 
organizations will select measures that are easy to obtain but may not provide the data 
needed to make informed decisions. Collecting meaningful measures is often a more 
complex endeavor and will demand the commitment of time and resources.346  
The GPRAMA describes several considerations in determining accurate and 
reliable data sources.347 First, the intended use for the data and how accurate the data 
needs to be to measure the progress must be determined. Sometimes, using already 
available data is preferred, but it does not make sense to measure with a micrometer when 
a yardstick will provide the needed information. This consideration will ensure data 
collection resources are used frugally and economically.  
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The next step is to identify the data source or sources. The goal for identifying 
data sources is to minimize the collection process’s effort. Adding steps to existing 
processes in order to collect data is not ideal, but it is often necessary, particularly if data 
collection was not previously part of the agency culture. Once the data is collected, there 
must be a means to verify and validate the data values. 
The GAO defines verification as “a process of checking or testing performance 
information to assess other types of errors, such as errors in keying data.”348 Validation is 
defined as “an effort to ensure that data are free of systematic error or bias, and that what 
is intended to be measured is actually measured.”349 This step is critical to avoid the old 
axiom “garbage in, garbage out.” Since the data is instrumental to determine funding 
priorities and other strategic decisions, good data feeding into the decision process is 
vital. Verification and validation support the data’s accuracy and reliability and instill 
confidence in management for credible and transparent decisions.  
Finally, any limitations to the available data will need to be understood and a 
strategy must be developed to either compensate for the limitation or provide a caveat at 
the data presentation. There are limitations to all collected data that can lead to poor or 
uninformed decisions, which result in lower performance or inaccurate performance 
assessments. Significant data limitations should be documented on the assessment with 
an assessment of potential impacts for the organization as well as mitigation strategies to 
counter the limitations. Data limitations can include imprecise measurements, incomplete 
data, an inconsistent data collection process, or data collection rates that do not allow 
timely strategy adjustments or decisions.350 Understanding the gaps in current data 
sources and determining new information needs, along with ways to gather the new 
information, are important parts of a performance management system.351  
A review of data quality characteristics among agencies and subject-matter 
experts is represented in Figure 13. This illustration shows the most universally included 
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elements are validity, timeliness, consistency, accuracy, and ease of use. The GAO 
defines these terms as: 
• Validity—the extent to which the data adequately represent actual 
performance. 
• Accuracy—the extent to which the data are free from significant error. 
• Consistency—the extent to which data are collected using the same 
procedures and definitions across collectors and times. 
• Timeliness—whether data about recent performance are available when 
needed to improve program management and report to Congress. 
• Ease of use—how readily intended users can access data, aided by clear 
data definitions, user-friendly software, and easily used access 
procedures.352 
 
Sources: 1 DOD Continuous Process Improvement Transformation Handbook, May 2006, 2–13.  2 Bob Frost, Designing 
Metrics; Crafting Balanced Measures for Managing Performance, Measurement International, 2007, 62–63. 3AT&T Quality 
Steering Committee, Data Quality Foundations, Quality Process Center, AT&T Bell Laboratories, 1992, 29. 4Government 
Accountability Office, GAO-GGD-99-139, Performance Plans, Selected Approaches for Verification and Validation of 
Agency Performance Information, July 1999, 13. 5 David M. Ammons, A Brief Guide for Performance Measurement in 
Local Government, National Center of Public Productivity, Rutgers University, 1997. 
Figure 13.  Data Quality Characteristics 
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These data quality elements and limitations provide the framework for developing 
a data collection plan. The collection plan should indicate how often each measurement 
should be taken—hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, or annually. It should also identify the 
specific date and/or time of day that will provide the best indicator for factors affecting 
performance. All measurements collected should have an associated date/time stamp to 
facilitate future analysis. 
An additional consideration in establishing the collection plan is who is going to 
be consuming the data, measurements, or information. It can be: 
• A responsible individual for the program, project or task  
• The individual or team accountable for the results 
• Anyone with a support role in the program or project involved in the 
process 
• Potentially those who need to be informed of program performance (to 
include stakeholders and government officials) 
Additional questions include: What is the best format in which to present the 
data? What are the best methods to distribute or receive feedback on the data? What 
analysis or manipulation of the data is necessary to improve usefulness or quality? What 
costs or burden in the collection process or analysis are necessary before the data can be 
useful?353  One example of a data collection plan is shown in Figure 14.354 
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Figure 14.  DHS Data Collection Plan 
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Preparedness metrics “should measure the ability to perform the missions and 
tasks assigned to them by the strategy. As the strategy changes and evolves, these tasks 
can change, and readiness metrics should adapt as well.”355 
The OMB defines a target as “a quantifiable or otherwise measurable 
characteristic that tells how well or at what level an agency or one of its components 
aspires to perform. In setting and communicating targets, agencies should include the 
baseline value from which the target change is calculated.”356 DHS uses capability 
targets in describing its performance criteria.  
Capability targets are defined in the Goal as “the performance threshold(s) for 
each core capability.” Further, performances measures are defined as “the metrics used to 
ascertain actual performance against target levels identified for each core capability; by 
design, they are clear, objective, and quantifiable.”357 Using these two definitions, it 
would appear the Goal intends for its listed capability targets  to begin the process of 
designing or defining a performance measurement system. To analyze the effectiveness 
of measuring performance based on the information provided in the Goal, it is useful to 
analyze a sample of the provided capability targets. One target from each of the five core 
capabilities is provided with a brief analysis in the following paragraphs.358 
Long-term vulnerability reduction is a core capability within the mitigation 
mission area. One of the targets assigned to this core capability is to “achieve a 
measurable decrease in the long-term vulnerability of the Nation against current baselines 
amid a growing population base and expanding infrastructure base.” Some of the 
performance measurement challenges in in this area are: what vulnerabilities are 
determined a priority and how are they stratified; how the current vulnerability baselines 
are determined; and how the changing population dynamics and growing infrastructure 
affect the collected data’s reliability.  
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Threats and hazard identification is another core capability within the mitigation 
mission area. One of the listed target capabilities is to “identify the threats and hazards 
within and across the states, territories, and the top 100 metropolitan statistical areas, in 
collaboration with the whole community, against a national standard based on sound 
science.” The annual THIRA report completed by all Homeland Security Grant Program 
funding is a key component in meeting this target capability. However, the subjectivity of 
the entities completing the report raises concerns; How can sound science evaluate the 
reported threats and hazards, and how can the national standard be identified? 
Additionally, the level of whole community involvement needs to be better defined so the 
proper statistical sample population can be included in the individual reports. 
Fatality management services are a core capability within the response mission 
area. One of the Goal’s target capabilities  is to “establish and maintain operations to 
recover a significant number of fatalities over a geographically dispersed area.” To 
effectively collect measures that can assess this capability, standards and baseline 
information need to be established. The term “significant number” also needs specificity 
to eliminate subjective interpretation. 
Housing is a core capability within the recovery mission area. Its target capability 
is to “establish a resilient and sustainable housing market that meets the needs of the 
community, including the need for accessible housing within the specified time frame in 
the recovery plan.” Again, there is much subjectivity in the wording. What factors 
determine a resilient and sustainable housing market, and how would those factors 
change based on the multitude of economic, geographic, and demographic conditions that 
occur throughout the United States? What standards exist for the jurisdictions that are 
establishing the time frame to be met? 
Intelligence and information sharing is a core capability within the prevention 
mission area. A listed target capability is to “share relevant, timely, and actionable 
information and analysis with Federal, state, local, private sector, and international 
partners and develop and disseminate appropriate classified/unclassified products.” To 
collect less subjective data, there are many terms in this target area that need specific 
definition, including relevant, timely, actionable, and appropriate. 
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The target capabilities, as identified in the Goal, provide limited utility on their 
own merit. Much work is needed to meet the Goal’s objective to “analyze current 
performance against our intended capabilities, the defined targets, and associated 
performance measures.”359  
It is extremely difficult to measure or otherwise determine effectiveness of all the 
identified target capabilities. Newly developed quality preparedness metrics will 
undoubtedly not be perfect predictors of actual performance, and may not measure true 
capability. The aspiration, then, should be a performance measurement system that 
“comes closer to collecting relevant performance measures, and to continue improving 
and refining these metrics over time.”360  
DHS has recognized both the need for better performance measures and the 
challenge that exists in collecting them. They have identified a new initiative called the 
Analytic Agenda that will “enable the creation of a full set of performance measures for a 
given study topic; support analytically informed strategy development, resource 
allocation, investment, and operational decision making for that topic; facilitate 
systematic program evaluation; and optimally deliver indicator and warning capabilities 
to allow the Department to assume an anticipatory posture.”361 Although the initiative’s 
focus is limited by leadership’s priority for a given study topic, this proposal offers hope 
for the inclusion of preparedness measures and whole community involvement. 
“Strategy-based metrics are vital because they connect strategy, assigned 
missions, and mission-essential tasks to the readiness data being collected and 
analyzed.”362 The links between strategy, mission, and task drive the manager to think 
and analyze in terms of outputs. The manager uses the defined strategic goals (outputs) to 
inform budget and resource allocation decisions (inputs). But before a manager can 
adequately assess the impact resources have on mission performance, an organization 
must develop measures that can document their ability to accomplish assigned tasks. If 
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the organization’s ability to measure their performance of mission tasks cannot be 
quantified, then it is not possible to evaluate the program’s inputs and processes.363 
DHS should develop a performance management process that considers multiple 
perspectives and evidence sources to understand the progress made on each strategic 
objective. Progress toward achieving individual quantitative performance goals related to 
the strategic objective is one important consideration, but is not solely representative of 
the scope, complexity, or external factors that can influence program results and 
outcomes. When reviewing progress on each strategic objective, agencies should, at a 
minimum, consider: 
• If desired changes have occurred in the ultimate outcomes the agency 
seeks to improve and whether these outcomes are directly measureable or 
must be assessed through proxies or other means of evaluation 
• Progress made by the agency toward the performance goals established in 
the most recent Annual Performance Plan that relate to the strategic 
objective, including both outcome indicators and output indicators 
• Program evaluations, research studies, data and policy analysis or other 
assessments relevant to the strategic objective or the related programs 
• External factors affecting the strategic objective, including existing and 
likely changes in the operating environment, the size of program demand, 
or challenges faced during program execution 
• Benchmarking information from others trying to accomplish the same or 
similar objectives or using the same or similar key process 
• Lessons learned from past efforts to continuously improve service delivery 
and resolve management challenges, especially in coordinating across 
organization components and with delivery partners 
• Effectiveness of coordination and collaboration across organizational 
boundaries and with delivery partners including management milestones 
met 
• Identification, assessment, and prioritization of probable risks that may 
impact program delivery or outcomes significantly in the coming year or 
two 
• Effectiveness of scaling efforts  
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• Budgetary, regulatory, or legislative constraints that may have an impact 
on progress364 
G. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM 
In DHS’s 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, the Analytic Agenda initiative described the 
data collection and management challenge: 
The Department of Homeland Security must be able to harness vast 
amounts of data to inform strategy and future planning. There are a 
number of key areas where DHS must improve its ability to collect new 
data, analyze existing data, and present data in a compelling way to our 
partners and the public. The Department’s four-year Analytic Agenda 
provides the foundation for tackling this “Big Data” challenge and 
supporting analytically-informed decision-making across DHS 
missions.365 
This “big data” challenge is immense given the Department’s diverse and 
complex mission sets. Typically, the big data moniker invokes a massive information 
technology and knowledge management system acquisition. DHS’s priorities are stated to 
be “building and institutionalizing the necessary data, models, and business process.” The 
topical development approach will help place the priorities in the proper perspective. 
Before another information management system can be developed, the processes and data 
requirements will need to be better defined. 
The DOD has used the Status of Readiness and Training System (SORTS) since 
1986 to “report on readiness across the services. SORTS compares the level of inputs to 
target amounts determined by the services. Individual units are measured on a scale of 
one to four in four areas: personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment 
condition, and training.”366 
SORTS uses quantitative indicators and commanding officers’ judgments to 
assess if units have the personnel, equipment, training, and supplies they need to go to 
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war.367 While SORTS has been the most comprehensive and widely used readiness 
reporting system in the DOD for more than 25 years, it has also been subject to much of 
the same criticism attributed to DHS measurement systems. Among the critiques are: it 
uses subjective inputs, is prone to errors, lacks standardization, and delivers misleading 
scores due to broad measurement standards that can mask underlying problems in critical 
areas.368 The DOD’s newest capability system is the Readiness and Reporting System 
(DRRS). Although it has taken more than 10 years to implement, it is now widely 
accepted in DOD as an improvement over SORTS. Even with a legacy system to upon 
which improve, and years of development, two concerns about DRRS remain 
standardization and subjectivity.369 
The USAF utilizes a web-based program called the Management Internal Control 
Toolset (MICT) to manage the enterprise self-assessment and inspection system. It 
provides information transparency and data ranging from a complete compilation of all 
current and relevant guidance, policy, directives, and statutes to audit histories and 
individual self-assessment results. The USAF also uses the self-assessment data and 
history to more effectively manage their unit inspections by identifying specific subject-
matter experts for on-site inspections to ensure the identified problems and challenges are 
fully addressed. These experts can also provide mentoring and assistance in resolving the 
issues.370 Finally, when the self-assessment identifies a program or process deficiency, 
MICT has a built-in tool to facilitate a corrective action process that tracks progress until 
the root cause of the shortfall is under control.371 MICT’s standardized and 
comprehensive data storage can also benefit headquarters staff through enterprise-wide 
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trend analysis and can reveal systemic issues that warrant close or immediate attention. It 
can also more effectively identify best practices.372 
The DOD has used readiness and capability reporting systems for decades, and 
should be considered for lessons learned and benchmarking. The military and homeland 
security enterprise have common missions; both respond to crisis situations; prepare for 
the unexpected through training and exercises; acquire, maintain, and sustain professional 
equipment; and maintain a cadre of experienced and ready personnel. These shared traits 
provide the basis to explore the DOD’s system of assessment for features that will 
mitigate long-standing performance measurement issues in DHS.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions and recommendations from this research form a starting point to 
better understand preparedness within the homeland security enterprise, and to develop a 
means to accurately report and understand national gaps and priorities. 
There are many established tools and techniques to apply to the performance 
management system. A few of these were discussed in this thesis to illustrate potential 
applications, but the discussion only serves as an introduction to what will be a long and 
intensive effort. Success in this endeavor will only be realized through persistent and 
dedicated efforts with support and engagement from senior leaders across the enterprise. 
A. FINDINGS 
The Homeland Security Enterprise Lacks Sufficient Performance 
Management Expertise 
While federal agencies are required to have performance improvement officers 
(PIO) included within their organizations, these professionals’ ability to adequately 
address process performance across the whole of community is inadequate. If reporting 
on national preparedness is to improve, a dedicated and knowledgeable team of 
performance professionals working within the SLTT jurisdictions is needed. 
(1) Recommendation 1: DHS should establish an initial cadre of SLTT 
performance improvement officers providing one position to each of the 
56 jurisdictions. 
Creating federal PIO positions will ensure standardization and control over the 
process. This is essential to reduce the tendency for local jurisdictions to use the 
performance management process improperly or skew reported data to gain an advantage 
in grant-funding allocations. Additionally, hiring the PIOs under federal systems will 
establish benchmarks for the required PIO knowledge, skills, and abilities and 
standardize their salary schedules to provide uniform competency across the enterprise.  
The portfolio of these positions would include all of the DHS-related block grant 
funding streams. Therefore, states with more complex federal revenue streams due to 
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multiple UASI cities, water ports, and tribal entities, among other grant programs, will 
require a potentially higher-experienced PIO, or even perhaps an assistant. These 
additional requirements should be balanced by the less complex states and territories. If 
the average salary for a PIO position is $100,000, and this figure is tripled to account for 
benefits and job function expenses, the total annual outlay for sustaining the human 
capital portion of this capability is approximately $16.8 million.  
The amount provided to SLTT jurisdictions through FY 2014 preparedness grant 
programs was in excess of $1.6 billion, making the investment in performance capability 
only 0.01 percent of the total allocation. Prior analysis indicated “the cost of using federal 
employees or contractors to collect and validate preparedness data at the state and local 
levels would be cost-prohibitive.”373 Using these resources to analyze and inform the 
entire preparedness process—not just collecting and validating data—should easily pay 
for itself through increased efficiencies and a more effective national program. 
Undoubtedly, this recommendation will not resolve DHS’s performance 
management challenges alone. The SLTT jurisdictions will also need to train executives 
and program managers in performance improvement techniques and processes. SLTT 
jurisdictions should also dedicate a staff position to work with the federal PIO. 
(2) Recommendation 2: DHS should establish standardize performance 
management training curricula or identify an existing training program for 
federal and SLTT personnel. 
Creating a training program specific to DHS will result in standardize tools and 
techniques used throughout the enterprise. It will also serve as a means to capture lessons 
learned and good practices from the field as PIO practitioners move through advanced 
courses of study. A DHS-specific training program can also be tailored to provide 
awareness training for operational staff to better understand their roles in the performance 
management process as well as the importance of standardized measurement collection 
and reporting.  
                                                 
373 GAO, FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and Implement a System, 13. 
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Performance Measures for the Enterprise are Ineffective and 
Deficient 
The cadre of PIOs focused on SLTT performance management using standardized 
methodologies will provide the best opportunity to identify valid, timely, consistent, 
attainable, and actionable data on SLTT programs and processes that will better inform 
DHS and Congress on national preparedness. Over time, these efforts will help inform 
funding levels and priorities for national priorities. In addition, the data will begin to 
show program development progress and promote efficiency by identifying sustainment 
funds for mature programs and freeing up resources for building the next priority 
capability.  
In conjunction with the development of performance metrics, the PIO cadre will 
be invested in designing and contributing to the state and national preparedness reports, 
state and federal strategic planning efforts, THIRA reporting, grant reporting 
requirements, and federal and state process improvement efforts. 
(3) Recommendation 3: DHS should establish the critical few common 
measures within each mission area and initial reporting criteria for SLTT 
jurisdictions. 
DHS, through the preparedness PIOs, should identify two to three common 
metrics for each of the five DHS mission areas for SLTT jurisdictions to collect and 
analyze. Each metric will have established standards and criteria. Once enough data is 
collected to analyze and establish trends, the data will be evaluated for quality and 
relevance. Acceptable data elements will be incorporated into the performance 
management system with benchmarked performance goals and timelines. 
(4) Recommendation 4: DHS should delay investment in and development 
of an SLTT-specific performance/comprehensive assessment system. 
Any further investment into developing a web-based or other comprehensive 
assessment system should be postponed until the metrics feeding the performance 
management system are vetted and functional, and the process for reporting and 
interfacing with the system are established and tested. Incorporating SLTT data into the 
system will significantly change how information and knowledge are generated and 
 122 
increase the complexity of analysis. Understanding the new process and information 
availability will inform the technological system requirements. Additional processes to 
consider including in the next version of the system are: audit, assessment, and inspection 
findings; after-action reports; and corrective action plans and results. 
The next iteration of the comprehensive assessment system should take advantage 
of the capabilities of legacy systems as well as the lessons learned and shortfalls. Further 
development of a performance assessment system includes the “need for more effective 
coordination with state, local, and tribal governments and the need for information 
technology systems that are updated and integrated throughout the agency.”374   
(5) Recommendation 5: The DHS should develop measures of efficiency and 
effectiveness for the PIO program to identify areas for improvement and 
report on value for savings achieved. 
SLTT PIO program will need to show value and results for continued funding and 
ultimate sustainment. These measures should undergo the same rigor and quality 
standards as the key metrics supporting the core mission areas. This data should inform 
senior leaders on effective use of the resources and highlight areas for improvement. 
Alignment of Strategic Goals Is Weak 
DHS’s ability to assess and report on national preparedness is dependent on SLTT capability 
reporting. To gain a true assessment, data from the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and 
non-profit organizations will also need to be collected and included in the overall assessment. The process 
of collecting and compiling this data, however, will require an iterative approach that includes adding 
additional sources of data as the system matures. Aligning the data collection efforts of the SLTT 
jurisdictions to national strategic priorities will facilitate a more comprehensive and accurate national 
preparedness assessment. 
(6) Recommendation 6: DHS should devise  a method to normalize data that 
does not share common attributes or collection standards. 
Data that is standardized and common across the entire homeland security 
enterprise will be small in comparison to the total available data. To adequately assess 
                                                 
374 DHS Office of the Inspector General, OIG 10–23, FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next 
Catastrophic Disaster -An Update, September 2010, 8. 
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national preparedness, the non-standard data or data unique to specific jurisdictions will 
need to be developed in such a way that it can contribute to the overall assessment. Data 
quality will continue to be a significant concern to ensure the data input retains validity, 
consistency, timeliness, and accuracy. Normalization of this data can be accomplished 
using benchmarked.  
(7) Recommendation 7: DHS should use OIG and other external assessment 
findings to determine challenges and issues systemic to the homeland 
security enterprise. 
The OIG has performed audits and assessments of state and local homeland 
security programs for many years, reporting on findings in areas such as “homeland 
security strategies, obligation of grants, reimbursement to subgrantees for expenditures, 
and monitoring of subgrantees’ performance and financial management, procurement, 
and property management.”375 Many of the OIG’s findings have been reported on over 
many years and other findings are evident in almost all of the jurisdictions assessed. 
Processes and procedures deemed critical to the performance of the homeland security 
mission or proper stewardship of taxpayer dollars are as important to the overall 
enterprise as building capabilities. These identified findings should become a focus of the 
performance management system and should be included in metric development and 
tracked to resolution.  
A technique to analyze OIG data can be derived from the USAF OIG. They 
establish broad categories of codes to be used in identifying deficiencies, results, or 
findings during their inspection process. The codes are broken down into: equipment/
tools, guidance, leadership/supervision (LS), resource shortfall (RS), safety, training, and 
human factors. In addition, sub-categories are assigned with a sequential numbering 
system. For example, “LS8—Unit failed to adequately program resources” is a code 
given when management improperly allocated resources. In this instance, the causal 
factor was attributed to poor management decisions and not to a general lack of resources 
                                                 
375 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Countering Terrorism; Semi-
Annual Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: DHS, April 1, 2014—September 30, 2014), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/SAR/OIG_SAR_Apr14_Sep14.pdf. 
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where a code of RS would have been assigned.376 This type of coding system facilitates 
the analysis of data through categorization and provides the headquarters agency a means 
to identify trends across the enterprise. This analysis can highlight areas for future 
analysis and expose gaps in data and information. 
(8) Recommendation 8: DHS should expand the SLTT PIO role to include 
all federal block grant programs. 
The focus of this thesis was limited to national preparedness efforts within the 
DHS mission portfolio. Because of the broad scope of interdependencies within the 
homeland security enterprise, there are numerous opportunities for other federal 
stakeholders to include their SLTT grant programs in the performance management 
system. Stakeholders such as the Departments of Justice, Interior, Treasury, Housing and 
Urban Development, Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Defense, State, Health and 
Human Services, and Transportation all have SLTT grant programs that either 
complement or directly support DHS missions and goals. Analyzing all of the grant 
opportunities and aligning the outcomes of individual grant goals and objectives to 
national priorities would reduce redundancy of effort and improve overall effectiveness. 
Improved cooperation and coordination among the programs at the federal level will also 
facilitate improved synergy among the associated departments within and among the 
SLTT jurisdictions.   
The Self-assessment and Reporting Process Is Ineffective 
The primary weakness of prior DHS assessment systems was the inconsistencies generated by 
self-assessing and reporting. While self-assessment will always be a component of the overall evaluation, a 
means to validate the reported information is needed. The addition of the SLTT PIOs provides a means to 
validate select processes and data collection methods on a random and as-required basis. A rigorous and 
comprehensive validation and review will be required within a predetermined period to ensure strategic 
decisions are based on reliable data. 
(9) Recommendation 9: DHS should expand the OIG’s role to include an 
assessment of performance management and business processes. 
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Current assessments by DHS OIG or DHS headquarters staff tend to evaluate 
SLTT products such as strategic plans, THIRA data, or preparedness reports as complete 
or incomplete. This approach does not evaluate how these documents are integrated into 
the SLTT decision-making process,  stakeholders’ involvement in generating the 
documents, or the rigor and analysis put into the products. The result is a check-box 
mentality that overlooks or fails to take full advantage of the process’s benefits. An 
expanded OIG assessment into the agency’s business practices would provide increased 
confidence in data quality and local capabilities. 
(10) Recommendation 10: DHS should incorporate practitioners from federal 
as well as SLTT jurisdictions into the OIG assessment process. 
The OIG should be augmented by highly experienced and specifically trained 
staff to facilitate the expanded assessment. These staff should be vetted by central 
authority for required experience and expertise, and nominated as OIG inspection team 
augmenters. Once approved, the staff member should attend an inspection training course 
and complete a set number of inspections as an observer before being cleared as a 
primary inspection team augmenter. Augmenters should come from a wide range of 
agencies and offices to include DHS, FEMA, FEMA regional offices, tribal, state, and 
local jurisdictions. This practice will improve information sharing and distribution of 
good practices across the enterprise. 
Policy Decisions on Roles and Responsibilities are Needed 
National preparedness has been defined through the whole community concept. 
Each part of the whole community needs to understand its function in the enterprise and 
its expected actions to best satisfy preparedness requirements. As funding allocation 
decisions are made to develop and carry out those functions, the appropriate level of 
government that can best oversee the accomplishment of the goals and objectives needs 
to be identified. Federal and state agencies need to be involved in an open and transparent 
debate about the veracity of analyses that determine funding levels. Only then will 
different levels of government understand how effectively and efficiently they have used 
preparedness funds.  
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(11) Recommendation 11:  DHS should clearly define specific roles and 
responsibilities for developing capabilities within each mission area. 
To best determine funding decisions, every agency or department will need to 
understand how they are expected to contribute to meeting national strategic goals and 
objectives. Without a clear understanding, SLTT jurisdictions could either squander 
resources to build capabilities that are already, or SLTT jurisdictions could erroneously 
assume the capability is being managed by the federal government, resulting in a gap in 
national capability.   
Funding Decisions Are Required 
Funding decisions will drive DHS’s ultimate ability to successfully report on the 
state of national preparedness. However, the combination of recommendations presented 
here goes beyond satisfying a mandated report. In addition to better understanding 
current national preparedness levels, these recommendations serve as a foundation to 
improve the enterprise through a more efficient use of resources and through better-
informed decisions making and priority setting.  
Establishing a cadre of 56 PIOs to facilitate SLTT performance assessment (and 
general process improvement) is not the total solution. There will be costs for an 
increased oversight and assessment program as well as specific training programs. These 
costs are essential to begin building the capability to meet the intent of GPRAMA and 
other federal laws.   
(12) Recommendation 12: DHS should fund PIO capability for all 56 states 
and territories and an expansion of SLTT oversight. 
This funding should remain stable over a five-to-ten-year period for program 
stabilization. The impact to SLTT grant recipients should not dramatically change until 
some maturity in the data collection process is developed and there is a reasonable 
confidence in the analysis.   
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B. LIMITATIONS  
1. Political Pressures 
One of the core challenges of a transparent and data-rich decision-making 
environment for determining funding allocation is the resulting change to the status quo. 
Jurisdictions that have influential or powerful congressional delegations could feel 
compelled to intervene when their constituents receive fewer funds as a result of the data 
analysis. Arguments could be made that the data is inaccurate or incomplete, or that the 
analysis was flawed or skewed. These interventions could undermine the entire effort of 
maturing the performance management system. Achieving consistent measures of 
effectiveness over time is difficult due to the demands of an ever-changing market 
environment and goal expectations. This is especially true for disaster management 
agencies, whose goals may be affected by the vagaries of political conditions rather than 
market conditions.377 
2. Investment of Time and Resources 
Just as Congress has demanded an accounting for the money spent in 
preparedness grants, so, too, will DHS want to see a positive return on investment for the 
cadre of PIOs. DHS should establish meaningful goals and objectives and a realistic 
timeline for developing the PIO program. In addition, a robust communication plan and 
awareness campaign should be initiated for appropriate congressional committees and 
stakeholders with frequent updates. 
3. Leadership Buy-in 
Program success will require support from the entire enterprise. The assigned 
PIOs will provide the necessary skills and knowledge to the performance management 
process, but results will depend upon SLTT leaders, directors, and program managers’ 
abilities to implement and sustain an effective system. 
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4. Enterprise Instability 
Emergencies and disasters are often “all hands on deck” events that take SLTT 
staff members away from their normal duties. The time to attend to response and 
recovery efforts for large events (relative to the jurisdictions’ capacity and experience) 
can disrupt normal operations for weeks or months. During this time, the priority for 
resource utilization will likely not include collecting and analyzing performance data. 
This poses a dilemma for the performance management system, since some of the most 
valuable outcome and output data is exhibited during crisis events. Incorporating data 
collection into the normal incident command tools and techniques will facilitate the 
collection and analysis of valuable data without detracting from normal response and 
recovery activities. 
C. SUMMARY 
DHS is an agency accustomed to wicked problems. Indeed, an array of wicked 
problems is at the essence of its core missions, and even inherent in DHS’s founding 
motivation. Performance management is not one of DHS’s core mission areas, but is a 
discipline that can help focus all of its core missions and transform the homeland security 
enterprise into a more effective collaboration with measurable efficiency. DHS’s inability 
to adequately report on performance indicators over the past decade has elevated its 
performance management efforts to a “wicked” status.  
For years, DHS implemented top-down strategies and approaches to establish a 
preparedness performance management system. As of this writing, there are few 
substantive results to show for the effort. The recommendations proposed in this thesis 
will shift the primary emphasis and effort of collecting and analyzing preparedness data 
from DHS headquarters to the SLTT grant recipients. Utilizing federal PIOs to guide and 
oversee the process will facilitate a standardized approach, while utilizing SLTT 
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